China’s “String of Pearls”
“Strengthen economic leadership, gain political leverage”
Harsh V. Pant and Premesha Saha
Introduction
This article surveys China’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean region.
The defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) coined the term “String of Pearls” in 2004 to refer to “China’s network of military and trade facilities, along with maritime links, extending from mainland China to southern Port Sudan.”
In March 2007, BAH held an “Energy Futures in Asia” seminar on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. The seminar focused on Chinese and Indian energy strategies for the future.
Its report, published in April 2007, stirred my interest in the notion of the “Balkanization” of Energy Networks. Countries worldwide seek to end their dependence on other countries for energy as quickly as possible. They are negotiating and signing agreements as fast as they can to achieve this goal.
One result is that fragmented energy networks emerge that lack a standardized energy market design. In turn, this has produced unintended geopolitical consequences.
These geopolitical consequences of China’s String of Pearls lie at the heart of my discussion.
In 2013, President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive infrastructure project to expand China’s economic and political reach from East Asia to Oceania, Africa, Europe, and Latin America.
I have previously addressed China’s ambitions in the South China Sea in two articles, “China’s plan: South China Sea” and “Hainan to Singapore: SCS.”
Let’s now look at what China is up to in the Indian Ocean Region.
The Council of Foreign Relations has said,
“Xi’s vision included creating a vast network of railways, energy pipelines, highways, and streamlined border crossings, both westward … and southward, to Pakistan, India, and the rest of Southeast Asia.”
Harsh V. Pant and Premesha Saha have commented,
“Beijing’s aim, through the BRI, is to strengthen its economic leadership while gaining political leverage over its neighbors and asserting its presence on the global stage.”
I, like others, must be forgiven if we see military implications in the BRI. In the case of the Indian Ocean, I do not want to overdramatize Chinese military advantages in this region, not yet. At present, the Chinese military is tinkering around, but it bears watching.
Joseph Nye’s “counsel that ‘the best way to make an enemy of China is to treat it like one,’ leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy” weighs on my mind. China and the US are certainly in great-power competition. The cause-and-effect dynamics can be mind-boggling.
Observers agree that great-power competition is fragmenting the global economy and creating a wide range of geopolitical relationships among countries.
Let’s move forward and address China’s “String of Pearls” in the Indian Ocean region. I’ll move from east to west. A lot of maritime traffic flows through the Indian Ocean, so I looked at the deals China has hatched for ports along the way.
Chinese funded ports
China has established relationships with four countries of the Indian Ocean littoral that are yielding ports, a kind of “lilypad” approach the US has employed around the world. Note that most of China’s oil sails through the Indian Ocean.
Myanmmar-Kyaukphyu
Myanmar and China have a strong relationship, but Myanmar is a basket case. General Min Aung Hlaing led a coup in 2021 and has ruled Myanmar since. The coup led to a civil war in 2021, and Myanmar continues to suffer from significant and complex ethnic conflicts, both of which persist to this day.
Both China and India are competing for Myanmar’s favor.
Kyaukphyu in Myanmar sits on the Bay of Bengal. Chinese companies largely owned by the state are constructing a deep-water port and industrial area there. The town is also the terminus of an oil pipeline to Kunming in the southwestern Chinese province of Yunnan. Kyaukphyu is attractive for a deep-water port because products can be transported overland to Kunming.
The China Briefing website has also mentioned Coco and Zadetkyi Kyun as developing Chinese outposts in Myanmar.
Chatham House has revisited past speculation that Myanmar’s Great Coco Island hosts a Chinese Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) site, but suggests it is more likely that the Myanmar military, called the Tatmadaw, might be building an airbase there, from which its aircraft could conduct military surveillance flights over the Indian Ocean, a capability India does not like.
Kartik Bommakanti, writing for the Observer Research Foundation of India, says the evidence is mounting that, at the very least, China is helping Myanmar develop its SIGINT capabilities on the island.
Bommakanti also suggests that Zadetkyi Kyun Island and Hangyii Island at the mouth of the Irrawaddy River may host SIGINT sites.
In the best-case scenario, Kyaukphyu could become a regional commercial hub. Zeyar Oo and Yonghong Dai have written,
“Full realization (of the Chinese development) has been impeded by several challenges, including political instability, local protests, insufficient cooperation between Myanmar’s government and Chinese investors, environmental concerns, and other potential risks.”
They add that China wants to avoid its ships transiting the Malacca Strait and, at the same time, improve its strategic standing in the Indian Ocean.
