Hainan to Singapore: South China Sea
From American dominance to a balance of power
New strategic relationships
Introduction
This report deals with the geopolitical chessboard in the South China Sea (SCS): Taiwan to the north and the Malay Peninsula’s island state of Singapore to the south.
The SCS is about power, primarily naval and air power, and the Chinese and American naval presence in that region. The US Navy (USN) has long dominated the SCS. China is poised to challenge that dominance.
The challenge now is to balance power with China.
Robert D. Kaplan, an American geopolitical analyst and author, has written the book Asia’s Cauldron and has brought the realism of his thinking to the fore when discussing the South China Sea, China’s impact on it, and the difficult questions facing other nations in the region and beyond, including the US and, specifically, the US Navy (USN).
I will often draw on Kaplan’s insights and foresight. I commend his book to you.
China is becoming a world power; that’s a given. Many see it as an enemy or a potential enemy and, most certainly, a robust competitor.
Joseph Nye, an American political scientist and former Assistant Secretary of Defense, highlights the views of Arthur Waldron and Robert Kagan, who portray China as a potential enemy, while Chinese leaders speak of their country’s “peaceful rise.”
For now, I see China as a formidable competitor who must be watched and handled carefully. Nye has said, “Avoid letting exaggerated fears create a self-fulfilling prophecy.” Said differently, “the best way to make an enemy of China is to treat it like one.”
China’s perspectives were shaped by foreign influences, including Japanese invaders and occupiers, as well as European and US imperialists. In the 19th century, European military personnel, businesspeople, and missionaries had a notable presence in China. The US Marines were stationed in Beijing, while the US Navy patrolled its rivers and coastal waters.
The US then supported Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China and opposed Mao Zedong, a communist revolutionary who defeated Chiang and forced him and his followers to the island of Formosa, now known as Taiwan.
These experiences have not been lost on the Chinese.
The issue of Taiwan remains unresolved. Taiwan is at the northern end of the SCS, and is an independent country. China’s problem is it does not own Taiwan and cannot control the SCS from its ports and airfields.
Hainan Island is China’s southernmost point, about 700 miles southwest of Taiwan. It has very good ports and airfields, and it oversees China’s SCS claims, which include the Paracel and Spratly Islands and, more recently, the Scarborough Shoal.
Hainan Island guards China's northern access to the SCS. The Paracels and Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal form China’s SCS “Iron Triangle," a conceptual framework linking the three. This Chinese Iron Triangle signals China’s aim to manage, perhaps even dominate, seaborne traffic through the heart of the SCS.
Hainan also forms the eastern boundary of the Gulf of Tonkin, enclosing it and partially blocking northern Vietnam's access to the SCS.
China maintains a significant military presence on Hainan Island, enabling it to project power across the SCS, long the US Navy 7th Fleet’s “playground.”
Singapore, on the other hand, sits far to the south, at “the narrowest point of the funnel that is the Strait of Malacca, the most important maritime chokepoint in the world,” according to Robert Kaplan. It guards the southern part of the SCS.
The Strait of Malacca connects the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. An estimated 102,525 maritime transits passed through the strait in 2025, up from 63,636 the previous year. Most traffic consists of container ships, but very large crude carriers (VLCCs) averaged 28 per day. Much of the oil destined for China passes through the strait, largely from the Middle East.
For its size, Singapore has a formidable defense establishment, though it cannot match China.
The US goal in the SCS is to deny China the opportunity to establish its hegemony there. China seeks to do the same to the US.
So let’s take a top-level look at the lineup.
Keep in mind that the US and China are not enemies; they are not at war. But they are two resolute great-power competitors. Also, keep Joseph Nye’s advice in mind: “Avoid letting exaggerated fears create a self-fulfilling prophecy.”
Hainan: a fortress
In 1965, the CIA published a four-part series on military activity on Hainan Island, based on imagery analysis. CIA analysts identified tracking and early-warning radar, airfields with multiple runways and construction, coastal defenses, a major shipyard, a torpedo boat base, support buildings and barracks, anti-aircraft artillery positions, and electronics sites.
Hainan was of great interest to the US in 1965 because of the Indochina War and because US combat fighters were engaged by Chinese fighter aircraft over and near Hainan.
Four Navy F-4 Phantoms on a combat air patrol to protect an EC-121 reconnaissance mission over the Gulf of Tonkin clashed with four Chinese F-5s on April 9, 1965. The latter aircraft were derived from the Soviet MiG-17. One F-4 and its two-man crew were lost, most likely hit by an F-4’s errant missile fired during the engagement. The Chinese accused the F-4s of infringing on their airspace.
On September 20, 1965, a USAF F-104 fighter’s navigation failed, and a Chinese J-6 fighter aircraft, derived from the Soviet MiG-19, shot it down. The USAF pilot was recovered and held in a Chinese prison for seven years.
Other incidents occurred over and near Hainan in the years that followed, at least one of which involved the shoot-down of a US fighter aircraft attempting to escape enemy fighters from North Vietnam.
All of that was in the 1960s. Let’s fast-forward to the present.
Hainan is ideally positioned for China’s naval and air forces to project power across the SCS. In my report, “China’s ambition: the South China Sea,” I examined China’s claims to islands and reefs in the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
The Long Term Strategy Group has estimated that China has spent more than $50 billion on military infrastructure in Hainan as of 2022, an amount that exceeds the value of all US facilities in Hawaii.
Ellen Nakashima andLaris Karklis, writing for the Washington Post, have said,
“The Greater Yulin Naval Base (on the island’s south side) is the epicenter of the Chinese naval presence in the South China Sea, split across two deepwater bays and featuring the two most expensive military infrastructure items in the region today: an aircraft carrier dry dock and a carrier pier.”
The naval base’s east side, known as Longpo Naval Base (formerly Yulin-East), hosts China’s ballistic-missile submarines and features caves that can accommodate several of them underground. Longpo also supports China’s aircraft carriers.
Hainan also hosts the Ledong Naval Air Base and the Jialaishi Air Base on its western side.
The Lingshui Air Base is about 35 miles northeast of the Yulin Naval Base and has hosted Y-9JB Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) aircraft and Y-9W airborne early warning aircraft (AWACS). It also supports various aircraft, including J-15 fighters and helicopters, from China’s aircraft carriers.
Ledong Naval Air Base in southwestern Hainan hosts the JH-7 fighter-bomber, used primarily for air-to-surface attacks; the JH-11B air superiority fighters; and several unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) capable of long-range tracking of air and maritime targets.
The Jialaishi Air Base in northwestern Hainan has hosted H-6 nuclear-capable heavy strategic bombers, AWACs, and ELINT aircraft. It also hosts JH-11B and JH-7 fighters.
The Chinese PLA Rocket Forces have built a relatively new (circa 2018) Rocket Force Base 10 km west of Danzhou in northwest Hainan. It likely hosts a road-mobile DF-26 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) unit capable of targeting land and sea targets with conventional and nuclear warheads. It may also host the DF-21 Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). Speculation also suggests it hosts the road-mobile DF-31AG Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).
China’s Wenchang Space Launch Facility, located on the northeast side of Hainan, became operational in 2016. Notably, in September 2024, it launched a DF-31A/AG road-mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) from the Wenchang area. The missile flew about 7,200 miles over and into the SCS. Wenchang has traditionally been used for state-sponsored orbital missions. Therefore, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) considers this unusual, even unprecedented.
Retired Admiral Michael Studeman has said, “They’ve built the ability to project power across multiple capabilities — air, missile, militia, ships, and submarines.”
Add all this together, and one can see that China has formidable defensive and offensive capabilities on Hainan, all of which can project its power throughout the SCS.
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- Hainan: A fortress
- Singapore: At the chokepoint
- Vietnam
- Malaysia
- Philippines
- Japan
- South Korea
- New strategic relationships
- China’s “Red Line?”
- Last thoughts
Singapore: At the chokepoint
The Republic of Singapore is an island state, with some 60 small islets, located at the southern end of the SCS at the Strait of Malacca, arguably the world’s most important maritime chokepoint. The island is small, about 285 square miles, and has a densely packed population of about six million.
Roughly seventy-five percent of the population is of Chinese origin. It became an independent nation in 1965 and is a member of the Commonwealth. The Johor Strait on its north side separates it from Peninsular Malaysia.
By all accounts, Singapore’s defense establishment is formidable. It is among the world’s most technologically advanced, and its air force and navy are the best in the region.
Singapore’s defense strategy is known as Total Defense, a strategy that,
“Involves every Singaporean playing a part, individually and collectively, to build a strong, secure and cohesive nation … Military Defence is about building a strong and formidable defence force that makes potential aggressors think twice before attacking us.”
That is Singapore’s bottom line: deterrence.
Singapore seeks a balance of power between China and the US, as well as the free flow of maritime traffic, to maintain its independence. Singapore’s problem is that China is in the neighborhood, whereas the US is not unless it chooses to be.
The nation depends on deterrence, diplomacy, and economic and technological development. It is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN, however, is not NATO. Instead, it is an economic and political group.
Singapore’s Armed Forces are a conscript-based, combined-arms force designed to deter any attacker and, if necessary, defeat them as far forward as possible.
Singapore is among the most densely populated countries in the world. The country is almost entirely urban, making it very difficult to invade and hold.
Singapore is keenly aware of the competition between China and the US. That said, it depends heavily on the US.
Dr. Rahman Yaacob has noted,
“No partnership is deeper than that with Washington. Singapore has signed more defence agreements with the US than with any other partner.”
The US shares intelligence, has access to Singapore’s military facilities, conducts numerous bilateral and multilateral military exercises with Singapore, and trains Singapore’s military personnel in the US. However, Singapore has sought to broaden its defense network, placing greater emphasis on Southeast and South Asian countries and on Australia.
Singapore has a strong military establishment and a robust technology sector that supports it. It places great emphasis on integrating both existing and emerging technologies into the forces that use them.
It employs a conscription system that requires all male citizens to serve two years of full-time National Service Force (NSF). It has an active-duty force of about 51,000, distributed across all services, with most in the Army. It also maintains a reserve force of over 250,000. Its air force and navy are considered the best in the region.
Singapore’s Army has 40,000 active members and fields the Leopard 2SG main battle tank, the Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle, and the Terrex Infantry Carrier Vehicle. Its ground and air forces train in the US, Australia, Brunei,New Zealand, andTaiwan. These forces could serve as a follow-on force if Singapore is attacked.
Singapore’s Air Force operates the F-5S Tiger II, F-15SG Strike Eagle, and F-16C/D/D+ Falcon fighters. It is slated to purchase 20 F-35 Lightning II fighters and employs Apache attack helicopters, heavy-lift helicopters, and C-130 transport aircraft. The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) is also procuring P-8 Poseidon and Gulfstream 550 maritime surveillance aircraft. It maintains a large permanent training presence at USAF bases in the US.
The Air Force is also considering the Global Combat Program (GCAP) sixth-generation fighter.
Incredibly, for such a small country, it has four air bases: Tengah Air Base in the northwest, Changi Air Base in the east, Paya Lebar Air Base sort of in the center, and Sembawang Air and Naval Base in the north.
Singapore’s Navy is considered the most advanced naval force in Southeast Asia and can operate over long distances. It operates three naval bases: Changi Naval Base in the east, Tuas Naval Base in the west, and Sembawang to the north.
The naval frigates have surface-to-air missile capability, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, cruise missiles, advanced machine guns, and can carry naval helicopters. Its submarines have anti-ship missiles and naval mines in addition to their torpedo complement. Furthermore, its Navy is using unmanned surface vessels.
Its Navy has multiple flotillas, each with four to six ships, including multi-role stealth frigates (6), tank-landing ships (4), submarines (6), and corvettes (6). It also has six squadrons of naval diving units, three engineering and logistics squadrons, and training units.
The USN does not maintain a naval base in Singapore, but a 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) granted the US access to Singapore’s naval and air facilities, and it has been extended several times through 2034. Singapore has expanded US access to its logistics facilities, allowing US aircraft carriers to berth there. The US has recognized Singapore as a major security partner.
The USN operates logistical and administrative facilities at Sembawang Naval Base in the north and uses Changi Naval Base. Kaplan has said that Singapore built the Changi base “solely to host American nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines.”
The USN has permanently stationed littoral ships and P-8 Poseidon aircraft in Singapore to patrol the SCS. The US Coast Guard’s (USCG) Expeditionary Squadron is currently operating from Changi to support this mission.
I’ll next briefly walk you through a list of countries with interests in the SCS, then address China’s “Red line” affecting these countries.
Go to next section: Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines, Japan, South Korea
