MiG Alley - Part Three

Credit: USAF Photo

 

The Chinese Air War Plan

 

Zhang Xiaoming, an Associate Professor of History at Texas A&M International

University has written about the Chinese Air Plan and its relationship to the Soviets. Robert Frank Futrell, a senior historian, wrote The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953; I will draw from both. They highlight a point that never dawned on me when thinking about the air war in Korea: 

 

The Chinese and Korean ground forces wanted their friendly air forces to use airfields in North Korea, and even the ROK from which they could attack Allied ground forces, an eventuality I suspect would have forced the UNC to withdraw from the Korean peninsula.

 

General Liu Ya-lou commanded Chinese air forces in this war. His air force, the PLAAF, steadily received MiG-15 aircraft in 1950 and 1951. The UNC was aware of this buildup. Futrell has said the USAF position, accepted in Washington, was that should the enemy conduct mass air attacks against Allied ground forces in Korea, its pilots could attack the airfields the enemy used, even if they were in China. This scenario did not come to pass.

 

Once the Chinese PLA invaded North Korea, the Chinese met to deliberate about the role of its embryonic air force in this war. Remember that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, only one year before the KPA invasion of the ROK. The leadership decided to train its pilots to fly MiG-15s, assist their ground forces where they could, avoid a tit-for-tat engagement with the Americans, but instead strike at the Americans where they could.

 

General Liu Ya-lou developed a plan to establish a “zone of air superiority” in northwest DPRK.  Xiaoming said, “An ambitious but cautious air war plan emerged with two implementing states,

 

• “The Chinese Air Force would first commit four air regiments (120 MiG-15s) to provide protection for transportation lines between the Chinese border and Anju in North Korea in January and February 1951.
• “Then, by mid-April, there would be six fighter regiments (five MiG-15s and one La-11), two Il-10 attack aircraft regiments, and four Tu-2 bomber regiments, totaling 360 planes, available to take part in the war.”

 

The planners then assessed how best to provide air support. They had two options:

 

•    Provide direct air support to ground forces from air bases in Korea.

•    Engage US aircraft from air bases in China.

 

Mao selected the direct air support option. This required constructing airfields in Korea that could handle jet aircraft, which proved challenging to crack. According to Xiaoming, Mao sent Stalin a telegram saying they could not find a single airfield in Korea. The dominant problem was that the construction crews would require air cover. Stalin said he would provide the needed support and asked Mao to provide air bases for the Soviets to use as well.

 

The Soviets “insisted China build four Soviet airfields simultaneously and let North Korea construct four airfields the Chinese needed.” This presented the Chinese and North Koreans with a manpower problem; the task required far more manpower than could be spared. 

 

Xiaoming wrote, “The Chinese troops worked day and night and completed the construction at Sunan, Yongyu, Namyonni, and Pyongyang by the end of May (1951).” These airfields were in a line from Anju on the Chongchon River to Pyongyang.

 

Allied forces could see the construction underway and conducted airfield attacks to make them unserviceable. The Chinese installed AAA guns in response, and the Soviets sent troops to guard the construction sites. Xiaoming said, “Chinese records show that the UN planes attacked these air facilities 72 times. One-third of their ordnance (6,826 bombs) hit runways, taxiways, or surrounding facilities.” The net result was the Chinese had to delay their air plan.

 

PLA General Peng Dehuai, the commander of the PLA in Korea, saw that his ground forces had stalled in February 1951, unable to cope with the maneuverability of the mechanized Allied forces. Allied air forces subjected his troops to heavy attack and bombardment. He complained to Mao that he required air cover, not only for his troops fighting on the ground but also for the supply lines to these troops. Mao went to Stalin.

 

Stalin agreed to send more MiGs to Andong (Antung) and told Mao his air forces needed to be at the front and the rear. This was not what the Chinese had sought. The US, in turn, stepped up its air attacks to the north against Chinese supply lines and to support its ground forces.

 

Xiaoming commented,

 

“After the UN aircraft repeatedly knocked out the rail bridges between China and Korea in late March (1951), Chinese leaders became desperate and turned to the North Koreans for help, asking if they could use their propeller fighters to supplement Soviet jets in providing cover for the supply lines.

 

“More critical to the Beijing leadership was the fact that there appeared to be no way to secure a full air commitment from the Soviet Air Force.

 

By mid-1951, the news about the PLA fighting against the Allies had grown grim. Stalin decided to weigh in. The Soviets had provided the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) with MiG-9s, not MiG-15s. The MiG-9 was the first turbojet fighter developed by Mikoyan-Guervich, and the prototypes appeared in 1945. It first flew in 1946 and entered service with the Soviet Air Force that same year. Wikipedia said the Soviets transferred “six divisions of MiG-9s, each with two regiments of 31 aircraft” to China in November-December 1950.

 

Xiaoming reported that Stalin sent “375 MiG-15s to the Chinese to replace the antiquated jets.” He continued,

 

“On 13 June (1951), Stalin wrote to Mao stating in no uncertain terms that he considered it ‘absolutely necessary now to start moving at least eight fighter aviation divisions from the sixteen Chinese divisions.’ In addition to two or three MiG-15 divisions, the Soviet leader asserted the Chinese leadership ‘could take to the front from central and southern China five or six MiG-9 divisions, which would operate effectively against bombers.’”

 

Stalin was trying to get the PLAAF to shoulder the burdens of the Korean War. He was still apprehensive about going to war against the US. In late June, Stalin “instructed Soviet air units in China to start retraining Chinese pilots of three air divisions immediately on MiG-15s, so that they could participate in the forthcoming operations in Korea.”

 

Soviet MiG-15s cranked up their air activities against US aircraft in MiG Alley in the fall of 1951. From November 1951 until the Armistice in 1953, Chinese and North Korean-flown MiG-15s joined with the Soviets to conduct aggressive air attacks, employing as many as 100 MiGs at a time. Xiaoming commented that the Soviets refused to set up a combined command with the Chinese and North Koreans. This decision impaired their ability to provide direct air support to their ground forces.

 

Xiaoming concluded, “China's partnership with Moscow proved a galling one.”

 

The net result for Chinese ground forces was that the Soviets, Chinese, and North Koreans could not mount air assaults on Allied ground forces.

 

 

The F-84 and F-86 are called in

Glimpses of the air battles that would ensue

 

I had long thought MiG Alley was where the F-86 fought against the MiG-15 in the battle for air superiority in the Korean War. It certainly was that. However, I learned that many other aircraft were also involved in the air battles in MiG Alley, which came as a bit of a surprise to me. 

 

Robert F. Futrell wrote The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, which the Air Force historian considers an authoritative work. I will frequently draw from it.

 

In this section, I intend to give you a flavor of the battles that occurred in MiG Alley, some glimpses over roughly a year, from November 1950 through November 1951. It’s remarkable what happened in MiG Alley during that period of war. I touch only the surface.

 

You will recall the Soviets sent their new MiG-15 swept-wing air superiority fighter with Soviet pilots to Antung, China, in August 1950. They stayed on their side of the Yalu until November 1950.

 

The Soviets brought their MiG-15s out of hiding on November 1, 1950, to challenge US aircraft flying in northwestern DPRK. My view is that they created MiG Alley. There was a lot of action in the Alley as the Soviet MiGs, piloted by the Soviets, came out to challenge the US. It was a full day.

 

According to Futrell, in the morning of November 1, 1950, three Yak fighters, I assume Sinuiji Yak-11s, attacked a Mosquito forward air control (FAC) T-6 aircraft and a B-26 Marauder about 15 miles south of Sinuiji. The B-26 shot down one Yak. Two F-51s arrived and shot down the other two Yaks. These Yak aircraft staged out of Sinuiji airfield and parked in revetments that opened toward the Yalu. That would make it more difficult to attack them in their revetments because attacking aircraft, such as jets like the F-80C, had to avoid overflying China. To line up for a jet fighter attack on the enemy aircraft in the revetment would risk overflying China and expose the F-80C to hostile AAA fire from the Chinese side of the Yalu.

 

The Yaks were not going to get the job done.

 

Sinuiju was an important target. It was on the southern banks of the Yalu, directly opposite the Antung, China, airfield. 

 

There were two three-quarter-mile-long Yalu bridges connecting Sinuiju with Antung, which could carry road and rail traffic. Futrell described six international bridges in this region: two at Sinuiju, a highway bridge at Chongsongjin, a rail bridge at Namsan-ni, and a highway and rail bridge at Manpojin. They were all targets for FEAF’s Bomber Command and the Navy’s Task Force 77 (TF 77).

 

Mitch Williamson, a technical writer interested in military affairs, wrote that five MiGs patrolling the Antung area in the afternoon spotted three F-51s in the area of Naamsi-dong, opened fire, and damaged one. After that, the F-51 fled the scene, possibly leaving two F-51s still in the area. He then said a different pair of MiGs attacked these two F-51s. The Soviets said they shot one down. The USAF acknowledged losing an F-51 but to AAA fire.

 

In another air battle on November 1, Williamson reported that three MiGs returning to Antung spotted 10 F-80Cs and attacked a flight of four. The Russians maintain they shot one down. The Americans reported losing an F-80C to enemy AAA fire on this date. The Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency said an F-80C piloted by Major Frank Louis Van Sickle, Jr., was attacking the Sinuiju airfield. His F-80C was damaged by AAA fire and crashed.

 

The dominant point here is that the Soviet-piloted MiG-15s came out of hiding on November 1, 1950, and attacked USAF aircraft operating in northwest DPRK. The Soviets said their MiGs shot down two USAF aircraft, an F-51 and F-80C. The USAF said it lost only one F-80C to AAA fire from the ground. 

 

It was a busy day. At the time, the MiGs carried North Korean or Chinese markings, and Soviet pilots half-heartedly tried to speak Korean. 

 

General Stratemeyer, the FEAF commander, had suspected Soviet MiGs were involved at the Antung, though he could not be sure. In a previous section, I said an RB-29 crew counted more than 75 fighters parked in neat rows at Antung Airfield on October 18, 1950. So the cat was out of the bag.

 

General MacArthur's problem was that PLA ground forces and their supplies surged across the Yalu from China. In his mind, the Yalu bridges had to be knocked out. General Stratemeyer instructed his air forces to attack these bridges without crossing into China.

 

On November 8, 1950, FEAF Bomber Command sent seventy B-29s against Sinuiju and the Yalu River bridges. F-80C and F-51s attacked AAA positions before the B-29s’ arrival. MiG-15s crossed over and attacked these American fighters. Lt. Russell Brown, flying a F-80C Shooting Star jet, was in this fight and knocked down one MiG near the Yalu, the first jet fighter to be shot down by a jet fighter. 

 

Lt. Brown said, 

 

“We had just completed a strafing run on Sinuiju antiaircraft positions and were climbing when we got word that enemy jets were in the area. Then we saw them across the Yalu, doing acrobatics. Suddenly, they came over at about 400 miles an hour. We were doing about 300. They broke formation right in front of us at about 18,000 or 20,000 feet. They were good-looking planes—shiny and brand, spanking new.”

 

Brown added,

 

“As a matter of fact, they were doing loops and barrel rolls! I thought to myself that this has got to be a crazy war when the enemy can practice stunt flying right in front of you! Suddenly, all hell broke loose. Lt Col Stephens shouted for me to break left. An instant later two flashing silver aircraft dove at me out of the sun. As they swept by, I opened the throttle and tacked onto the tail of one of them, trying to manoeuvre into a firing position. As I tried to close on the enemy fighter, my F-80 started buffeting badly because I was exceeding 0.80 Mach. These were definitely MiGs, and I got a clear look at the communist jet as we bottomed out and it started a very fast climb back up into the sun. The aircraft had no distinguishing markings — just polished aluminum, swept wings and plenty fast!

 

“When the MiG ahead of me broke to the left, he made a fatal mistake. There was little doubt that he could climb faster than me, but when he turned, I cut him off and got in four good short bursts with my guns. It was difficult to tell if I had hit him for he just rolled over and headed for the deck in a steep dive. I racked my F-80 around and followed him down. My airspeed was indicating over 600 mph, but I could not close the gap! At this time, he was about 1000 ft away when I gave him another four bursts. Black smoke poured from the right side of his fuselage. I knew it was now or never, so I squeezed off one long burst. Orange flames licked back over his fuselage and, suddenly, the entire MiG exploded in mid-air. After that I don’t remember what happened, as I was too busy trying to pull out of my high-speed dive.”

 

The B-29s arrived after receiving heavy AAA fire from the Chinese side of the Yalu which American fighters could not attack and neutralize. The B-29s flew at 18,000 ft. to avoid the AAA guns. At this altitude, Futrell noted, “the B-29s were inherently unsuited for pinpoint work.” They dropped their loads, burned out most of the Sinuiju area, and damaged the approaches to the bridges but did not destroy the spans. No USAF aircraft were hit.

 

TF 77 Navy Douglas A1-D Skyraiders came in on three consecutive days on November 8. 

 

On November 9, Lieutenant Commander William Amen, USN, shot down a MiG-15 with his F9F-2B Panther jet fighter while escorting the Skyraiders attacking the Yalu River bridges.

 

On November 9, an RB-29 flying a reconnaissance mission to photograph the bridges was escorted by eight F-80s. Two MiGs attacked it, hit it, and it crash-landed at Johnson AB in Japan. Five aircrew were killed in the landing. Cpl. Harry Lavene, a tail gunner, shot down one MiG. FEAF removed the RB-29 from Yalu missions and sent in RF-80s instead.

 

FEAF was not satisfied with the results on the bridges, given the efforts expended. To make matters worse, the Yalu became frozen, and the Chinese could move traffic over the ice. Understanding the challenges posed by the bridges, FEAF sent the bombers out with incendiary bombs to attack cities located near the Yalu.

 

On November 10, seven B-29s flew such missions near the Yalu River, and a MiG-15 shot down one. The crew bailed out but was captured.

 

The MiGs had made their presence known. During November 1950, the first month of the MiG attacks, the MiGs shot down two B-29s and seriously damaged two more, causing one to crash land in Japan and one to make an emergency landing at Kimpo Airfield. The US could not let this stand. 

 

But, the US had nothing in Korea to match the MiG-15 when that fighter came on the scene. Their presence in large numbers presented a huge problem for Allied forces. Command of the air was essential to protect the Allied forces fighting on the ground. They had moved up into the northern reaches of the DPRK, and Chinese ground forces invaded and pushed Allied ground forces southward. Now, the MiG-15 was in the air, challenging B-29 bombers and everyone else flying in northwestern DPRK. 

 

Worse yet was the threat of enemy aircraft using air bases in North Korea and even in the ROK, events that would likely have forced the Allies to withdraw completely from the Korean peninsula and cede it to the communists.

 

The question arose quickly: how can the Allies respond to these MiGs?

 

Let’s back up for a moment. The Korean War was not the top US military priority; that priority was with the USSR. Korea was not in the US defense perimeter. The US had been demobilized after WWII, and spending was cut back. Advanced aircraft were precious and could not be spared for Korea. The US Air Force, formed in 1947 from the Army Air Corps, was new and the weakest of the three military departments. It was arguable whether it could cope with even the Soviets. The issue confronting the US when war broke out in Korea was how to allocate scarce resources.

 

The Far East Air Force (FEAF) and its subordinate 5th AF in Japan, the 20th AF in Guam, and the 13th AF in the Philippines had an assortment, a mixed bag of fighter and bomber aircraft when the war in Korea broke out. Furthermore, FEAF was a defensive command. Its aircraft were in the Far East to defend the Japanese Home Islands, Okinawa and the Philippines. 

 

Once war in Korea erupted, FEAF had to use what it had on hand to fight against the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and later the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). North Korea and the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) did not have much of an air force. Therefore, it is understandable that FEAF felt the aircraft they had would be good enough. 

 

This was especially true since the American senior military leadership felt they could quickly defeat the North Koreans once ground reinforcements arrived. General Douglas MacArthur, USA, felt sure that US forces would be home by Christmas 1950. However, Major General Earle Partridge, USAF, the 5th AF commander, told his boss, Lt. General Stratemeyer, that they would have to prepare for a “conflict of indefinite duration.”

 

General Hoyt Vandenberg, the chief of staff USAF (CSAF) under President Truman, called the newly formed USAF a “shoestring” air force. There was a sense that the “shoestring Air Force” in place for Korea would have to be sufficient.

 

The introduction of the MiG-15 changed this calculus and threw a wrench into USAF planning and programming. The FEAF aircraft, mainly F-80Cs and F-51s, used to escort the B-29s in MiG Alley and conduct ground attacks, were easily outmaneuvered. Losing air superiority was not acceptable. Therefore, the call went out for more advanced fighters, namely the F-86 Sabre.

 

At the time, the USAF had two F-86 wings: the 1st Fighter-Interceptor Group (FIG) at March AB, California, and the 4th FIG at New Castle County Airport in Wilmington, Delaware.

 

Warren Thompson has written,

 

“Gun-camera film from an F-51 Mustang was the first solid glimpse at this mysterious ‘super fighter’ … The possibility of the USAF losing air supremacy over the Korean Peninsula was unacceptable.

 

“Eager to prevent this from happening, the Far East Air Force (FEAF), which controlled all USAF assets in theater, made an urgent request to the Air Force High Command that it immediately be sent F-86 Sabres. Within 72 hours of the first all-jet dogfight (MiG-15 vs F-80C) having taken place, orders had been cut that would see the USAF’s second (F-86) fighter group (the 4th FIG) sent to Korea. 

 

“Furthermore, Strategic Air Command’s best escort wing (27th FEW) equipped with F-84E Thunderjets) would also be committed to combat to help relieve some of the pressure exerted on the F-80 units that were flying close air support, interdiction, and fighter escort missions.

 

The F-84s were stationed at Bergstrom AFB, Texas.

 

The aircraft from both wings flew to California and were loaded aboard aircraft carriers. They arrived in Japan in late November 1950. They were not well protected from the elements while aboard the ship, so they required substantial work to prepare them operationally. 

 

At that time, these advanced aircraft were being shipped to Korea, and Allied ground forces were closing in on the Yalu River border with China. They then faced massive numbers of aggressive PLA forces invading from the north. 

 

According to Futrell, General Partridge at 5th AF “assigned a purely air superiority mission” to the 4th FIW F-86s. They were “to fly combat air patrol over northwestern Korea and to meet, turn back, and, if possible, destroy MiGs.” In other words, they were not in the bomb-dropping business.

 

Michael Napier, in his book Korean Air War: Sabres, MiGs and Metors, 1950-1953, addresses the F-86’s mission in Korea using different words,

 

“The role of the F-86 in Korea was to establish a fighter screen between the MiGs and the large number of UNC fighter-bombers flying daily low-level interdiction missions against the Main Supply Routes (MSR) running from Antung and Manpojin southwards through Sinanju to Pyongyang.”

 

I want to highlight the idea of establishing a fighter screen or flying Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and flying as an escort. These discriminators were important in Korea, where air combat resources were in short supply. 

 

The B-29s had far greater range than their fighter escorts. They would take off first and fly to predesignated points to meet their escort fighters, which had far less range. The escorts would fly along with the bombers as a protective shield. 

 

Fighter screens or CAPs were different. 

 

The fighter force flying screen, also known as CAP, would depart from their base, go to a designated area, and patrol, in this case, along the Yalu River. They set up a screen between the MiGs at Antung and the bombers. If MiGs came out to threaten the bombers, the fighter force on CAP would go after them to prevent them from getting to the bombers. If the MiGs got through the screen, the escorts would then have to fight them off.

 

All of this was a tricky business. Michael Napier remarked that the MiGs would “fly formations of flights of four to six aircraft stepped at different altitudes.” But they often came out with 50 or more MiGs, on occasion as many as 100. American pilots called these large MiG formations “trains.” 

 

The F-86s, on the other hand, usually went out on patrol with about 16 aircraft. 

The Sabres, therefore, had to decide whether to attack and select MiG to attack. They were not always sure the MiGs would attack the bombers, so they often stood their patrol watching and waiting. The MiGs were quite deliberate about whether to attack or not. They were almost always controlled by commands from the ground. Those ground controllers usually decided whether to engage the US jets or not.

 

The F-86s would take off from Kimpo Airfield in flights of four in 3-5 minute intervals to saturate the patrol area at varied altitudes. The MiGs often flew at higher altitudes, over 40,000 ft., which meant they left a contrail. The F-86s knew who their enemy was by spotting the contrails. It was then a matter of “if” the MiGs decided to attack. If “yes,” the F-86 would jack up his speed and join the attack. If “no,” the F-86s might hang back and monitor the area.

 

A variety of aircraft were used to fly bomber escorts and attack ground targets: F-51 Mustang, F-80C Shooting Star, F-94 Starfire, F-82 Twin Mustang, F-84 Thunderjet, B-26 Invader, and the B-29 Superfortress. They were all in the MiG Alley fight. The F-86s’ job was to protect them from MiG-15 attack.

 

 

 

Javier Guererro, writing “The B-29’s Campaign in the Korean War: A Chronology,” reported that FEAF Bomber Command used the B-29 to bomb North Korean cities operating as communications hubs, major enemy supply routes, strategic targets, the PLA’s flow of troops and supplies, and enemy ground forces fighting against the Allies.

 

The MiG-15 was designed to shoot down the B-29. MiG-15 attacks in the Alley were frequently against the B-29. 

 

While the new advanced fighters were traveling across the Pacific, the character of the Korean War changed. General MacArthur reported to the JCS on the scope of the PLA invasion on November 28, 1950. He had concluded that the Chinese had committed “a major segment of the Chinese continental armed forces … of an aggregate strength of over 200,000 men.” He determined that Allied forces must revert to defense rather than offense. The Allied forces on the ground would have to withdraw. He said in December that the UNC was “facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared war.”

 

By December 3, the Allied ground forces were withdrawing from the DPRK and moving back toward the 38th parallel and below. MacArthur pushed for permission to take the war into China. He did not get it.

 

On December 1, 1950, six MiG-15s attacked three B-29s and caused significant damage. On December 18, a MiG-15 shot down a B-29. You’ll recall that in November, MiGs shot down two and heavily damaged two more. 

 

This was bad news for the USAF. On the one hand, bombers were being lost that were needed to support Allied ground troops. But arguably even worse, a Soviet fighter aircraft confronted the USAF that could knock out SAC B-29s. If they did so in Korea, the conclusion was that they could do so while penetrating Soviet airspace. The B-29 was the darling of the USAF, but clearly, it had to be replaced. 

 

The newly arrived F-84s Thunderjet flew their first B-29 escort mission from Taegu Airfield, ROK, on December 7, 1950. I believe they escorted B-29s, which were attacking targets in support of the Marines and Army troops stuck at the Chosin Reservoir and trying to withdraw to the coast in eastern North Korea. The MiGs did not threaten these aircraft in this sector of North Korea. Why not, you might ask.

 

The MiGs confined their area of operations to MiG Alley. They were to stay close to their home base in Antung, China, enhance their capabilities against American aircraft prohibited from flying into China, protect the fact that Soviet pilots were flying against US pilots, and reduce the probability of the Americans getting their hands on one. There had been some thought in Washington circles that the MiGs, coupled with the Chinese invasion, were meant to establish a cordon sanitaire south of the Yalu. That might have been true for Soviet MiGs, but Chinese ground forces were pushing hard far below the Yalu. Chinese ground commanders wanted direct air support, which no one could provide.

 

Kimpo Airfield outside Seoul was the only airfield good enough to handle the Sabre at the time. Kimpo was already overloaded, so a detachment of F-86s was deployed there while the rest were kept in Japan. 

 

They flew their first combat air mission on December 17, 1950. Lt. Colonel Bruce Hinton, the commander of the 366th Squadron, scored a MiG kill on this first mission. Futrell believes the F-86 on the scene startled the MiG pilots. Hinton flew to MiG Alley from Kimpo at about 0.62 Mach to conserve fuel. Futrell said Hinton was lucky in that the MiGs approached him from below. Hinton went into a dive to gain speed, and he could keep up with his prey and knock him down.

 

The F-86 pilots continued the “Hinton approach” to conserve fuel by flying slower on their way up to MiG Alley so they could stay longer. Futrell said they launched in five-minute intervals as four flights of four aircraft in a fingertip formation, sixteen F-86s in all; when viewing an F-86 flight in the air, they would look like the tips of the four fingers of a human right hand. They arrived in their combat area at altitudes between 27,000 and 33,000 ft, “just below the contrail level.” They would look for their MiG-15 opponents’ contrails above them.

 

The Sabre pilots later decided to enter their patrol areas at 0.85-0.87 Mach, a higher cruising speed tactic. That meant they only had about 20 minutes to fight. The MiGs adapted to the F-86s and tried to time their attacks when the F-86s were about to leave their patrol station, which left the F-86 little time to fight. Futrell said they would have about 10 minutes to fight if attacked while they were withdrawing. 

 

This is where the MiG-15s had a considerable advantage. Shortly after takeoff from Antung, they crossed the Yalu and were in MiG Alley, ready to fight. And, if their fight was going badly, they could rush back to Antung, knowing the American fighters would not chase them into China. 

 

Conversely, the F-86s had to fly about 200 miles to get into the fight. If they were seriously damaged, their pilots would have to bail out over the Yellow Sea or in North Korea, risking capture.

 

Bill Todd, an F-86 pilot who flew with the 4th FIW, talked about this issue,

 

“ ‘Bingo Fuel’ was set at 250 gallons, which meant when the first plane (F-86) got down to 250 gallons of fuel, the squadrons would begin their flight home. Of course, the MiG’s were quick to figure out that ‘Bingo’ meant low fuel, and so when they’d hear that in a transmission, they would initiate an attack. What they learned the hard way was that 250 gallons gave us more than enough fuel to respond to their attacks. The dogfight that would follow usually resulted in their losing and running away. By that time our fuel would truly be at a minimum or below, so there were a lot of reduced power glides back to base after fights like that.

 

“After crossing into North Korea and upon command from Red Leader, you would spread out the formation and test your guns … After re-joining, the Group proceeded north to 35,000 feet and set up our patrol along the Yalu. The MiG-15s were based at Antung, which was on the north side of the mouth of the Yalu. Their airfield was quite visible to us and we could watch them take off, climb to altitude and fly adjacent to us on the north side of the river. They knew we were not allowed to cross over the river and used it to their advantage.”

 

The MiG pilots were right; the Americans were prohibited from overflying China and the USSR. One of the rules that would annoy fighter pilots a great deal is to say they cannot conduct a hot pursuit of a MiG to their home field in China.

 

Wayne Thompson and Bernard C. Nalty, writing “Within Limits: The US Air Force and the Korean War,” acknowledged that “Pilots sometimes ignored this prohibition (against entering Chinese airspace) when in hot pursuit of a MiG seeking refuge over China, and on at least one occasion they confused facilities across the Soviet border with targets in North Korea.”

 

The Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency commented on “hot pursuit” as well,

 

“Officially, the UNC prohibited ‘hot pursuit’ of Communist aircraft operating north of the Yalu River. However, in theater this limitation was often ignored with UNC airmen quietly pursuing Soviet/DPRK/CCF aircraft inside Manchuria, patrolling Manchurian airspace for targets of opportunity, and engaging CCF bases and air defenses.”

 

Dario Leone tells the story of F-86 pilot Major Robbie Risner, USAF, who “chased four MiGs across the (Yalu) river and finally caught the fourth deep in Manchuria, firing a burst that shattered the enemy’s canopy. The chase continued with the enemy pilot valiantly evading Risner to Tatung-kou airfield, 35 miles inside Manchuria. Once over the field, Risner and his wingman, 1st Lt Joe Logan, doggedly pursued the MiG as it flew between two hangars. Finally, Risner got in a shot and blasted off part of the enemy’s wing; it crashed alongside the runway.”

 

On December 22, 1950, two Sabre flights met up with 15 MiG-15s in the Alley and shot down six in a 20-minute dogfight. Futrell wrote, “After this bloodletting the MiGs eschewed combat for several days, but on December 30 came out for another engagement with 16 F-86s at the Yalu.” The F-86s damaged two MiGs. Following this, the MiGs stayed home until December 30. They then engaged 16 F-86s at the Yalu. The Sabre pilots reported damaging two MiGs.

 

Futrell gives an accounting of the F-86 during its first month in combat,

 

“Altogether (in December 1950), the 4th Wing had flown 234 sorties in counterair operations, during which 76 Sabres had engaged MiGs and destroyed eight, probably destroyed two, and damaged seven others.”

 

Futrell highlighted Sabre pilot impressions of the MiGs they had faced thus far,

 

“(The) pilots unanimously agreed that they had never before fought under such difficult circumstances … The MiG pilots could select the time and position for their attacks.”

 

They felt the two aircraft matched evenly in speed. The MiG could climb better to higher altitudes, but the F-86 had some advantages at lower altitudes. The F-86 had better armament. The Sabre pilots felt they would get only one chance to score a kill because their guns fired too slowly, and they needed a better gunsight.

 

The MiGs generally stayed close to the Yalu. They tended to attack American aircraft from high and to the rear. They held their attacks to one or two passes, and then they would break off and return to base. Futrell commented that “most MiG pilots were inept gunners,” firing beyond effective range.

 

In the context of the overall Korean War, Futrell labeled December 1950 as a “cataclysmic month.” 

 

Fifth AF concentrated on destroying as much of PLA as was possible. It inflicted heavy punishment on the PLA. Through December 16, “General Stratemeyer estimated that his airmen had killed or wounded 33,000 troops, the equivalent of four full-strength Chinese Communist divisions … In the latter half of December, FEAF crews estimated that they killed another 6,694 enemy troops, a slightly less number than the strength of another Chinese division.”

 

Nonetheless, in December, PLA forces crossed the 38th parallel, and Allied ground forces had to abandon Seoul and move to its south. The ROK government withdrew to Pusan. The PLA threatened and then captured Kimpo and Suwon airfields. The 5th AF had to withdraw its F-86s to Japan. The B-29s were directed to avoid MiG Alley.

‍ 

By the end of 1950, the scope of the Korean War had become much broader. It was no longer a matter of turning back the KPA invasion, which the Allies had done successfully. It was now a matter of having a military confrontation with China in Korea and Formosa and the USSR in Japan. Frankly, it was now a matter of survival for the UNC and its forces.

 

President Truman and the JCS decided that reunification of Korea was not in the cards. The JCS said, “We consider the preservation of your forces is now the primary consideration.” They would settle for an armistice. 

 

Futrell said,

 

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur on January 9 that the United States would continue to limit hostilities to Korea but that MacArthur was expected to defend successive positions, inflicting as much damage on the enemy as possible, subject always to the safety of the forces under his command.

 

“If MacArthur should judge that evacuation (from Korea) was essential to avoid severe losses of men and materiel, then he was to withdraw to Japan.”

 

It became clear to those in combat that the US objective was to limit the war to Korea, a delaying action, a situation that did not sit well with men in the fight, in this case, for two more years. Morale was low in all quarters of the UNC. Indeed, the 5th AF developed a plan to withdraw the entire 5th AF to Japan. 

 

Fifth Air Force photo interpreters had mounds of reconnaissance photos, but the PLA excelled at camouflage, and it was tough to determine where the enemy was and in what numbers. Furthermore, the KPA had “rejuvenated.” Fortunately, the PLAAF, whose pilots were being trained by the Soviets, was not yet prepared to come out and fight.

 

When it rains, it pours. 

 

US authorities knew China was rapidly building its air force, the PLAAF. As early as February 1950, there was evidence that the Soviets intended to build a PLAAF such that it would become “one integral part of the Russian air force.” There had been considerable concern that the Chinese would employ their growing air capabilities against Allied ground forces from bases in the DPRK and potentially even in the ROK. Futrell disclosed that FEAF concluded,

 

“The enemy obviously possesses the capabilities to mount a major and sustained air effort at any time.” If they did that, Futrell said, “The Reds could divert a substantial proportion of the United Nations air effort away from direct support of ground action, hinder the airlift into Korea, strike United Nations naval vessels and installations in both Korea and in southern Japan and provide some support for Red ground troops.”

 

The concern was so marked that, according to Futrell, “General Stratemeyer feared that air attacks against Okinawa might destroy two Superfortress groups based there. General Ridgeway (Commander 8th Army) asked General MacArthur to consider that, during a possible evacuation from Korea, the port of Pusan would be so jammed with men and materiel as to present a particularly inviting target for a Soviet or Chinese atomic bomb.”

 

Therefore, the matter of enemy airfields in the DPRK and the ROK commanded growing FEAF attention. Evidence showed that the enemy was repairing the airfield at Sinuiju, North Korea. As a result, the 5th AF decided to attack this airfield and put it out of commission.

 

War can be like a game of chess. Surprisingly, the MiGs did not fly during the first week in January, and no one challenged the B-29s throughout the month. 

 

The F-86s returned to Korea on January 17, 1951, initially to Taegu to test for Sabre operations. However, they were too far from the Yalu to patrol there and had to confine their flights to the area around Pyongyang. 

 

So, the F-80Cs and F-84s were sent to Sinuiju, and the MiGs came out in response.

Twelve MiG-15s attacked four F-80s south of Sinuiju on January 21 and shot down one. Sixteen MiGs attacked two flights of F-84s, which were attacking a bridge across the Chongchon River that same day. The MiGs shot down one. Lt. Colonel William Bertram, an F-84 squadron commander, scored the first F-84 shoot-down of a MiG.

 

On January 23, thirty-three F-84s launched from Taegu strafed Sinuiju. In response, 30 MiGs responded from Antung. The F-84s strafed the Sinuiju airfield, then joined other F-84s, and there was a 30-minute MiG-15 vs. F-84 air battle. Lt. Jacob Kratt, USAF, shot down two MiGs, and two other F-84 pilots each shot down one MiG. All the F-84s returned safely to base.

 

Also on January 23, 1951, forty-six F-80s went to Pyongyang to suppress enemy AAA fire while twenty-one B-29s flew from Okinawa to bomb Pyongyang’s main airfield. The F-80s and F-84s then withdrew to Japan. 

 

The net result was to mark a milestone in the air war over Korea. In February, the 5th AF ceded air superiority control over MiG Alley to the MiGs after pulling back its jet fighter force to Japan.

 

During the month, some RF-80s flew photo missions over the Yalu and were fortunate to escape swarming MiGs. Surprisingly, an estimated 25 percent of the MiG flights did not engage the RF-80s, and all returned to their home base in Japan. 

 

Futrell said the MiGs failed to take advantage of their opportunities in January and February. Instead, North Koreans and Chinese concentrated their efforts on repairing airfields in North Korea. 

 

In March, Allied ground forces recaptured Kimpo and Suwon airfields, and during the month, they pushed the Chinese back across the 38th parallel. In his book North American F-86 Sabre, Greg Goebel noted,

 

“The war of movement was over, and the rest of the war would be a static battle of attrition. The UN had the firepower, but the Chinese were willing to accept horrendous losses, and so the war dragged on.”

 

While the war certainly dragged on in a kind of stalemate, several significant air battles ensued, which I shall highlight.

 

Enemy attempts to build and rebuild airfields in the DPRK still commanded great attention. American commanders found it intolerable that the enemy would establish operational airfields in North Korea. That would give enemy air forces the potential to attack Allied ground forces, particularly bad as ground forces were in comparatively static positions.

 

On March 1, twenty-two F-80s were to meet up with 18 B-29s flying in from Japan. The B-29s were late, and the fighter escorts had to leave low on fuel. The bombers had to fly without escort and were attacked by nine MiG-15s. Ten B-29s were damaged, and three made emergency landings at Kimpo. The rest recovered at Taegu. A B-29 gunner did shoot down one MiG.

 

I’ll fast forward to April 12, 1951, known as “Black Thursday” for the B-29. David Kindy, writing for Smithsonian Magazine, said,

 

“The B-29 mission was to destroy a bridge on the Chinese border and disrupt the logistics flow. Some 50 F-84s escorted them. Thirty MiGs swooped down and began peppering the American bombers and jets with cannon fire … The Soviets darted in and out of the formations, shooting down three Superfortresses and heavily damaging another seven bombers. Outmaneuvered and outclassed, the American escort jets were helpless against the attack. In the confusion, they even shot at their own planes.”

 

Guererro described the events as well,

 

“The Sinuiju mission of April 12, 1951, became known as ‘Black Thursday’ among the FEAF Bomber Command crews. The mission was the last attempt to destroy the Sinuiju bridge (across the Yalu) and was carried out by a bomber force of 39 B-29s escorted by 54 F-84s from the 27th Fighter Escort Group and high cover from the 4th Fighter Interceptor Group’s F-86s.

 

“The mission encountered heavy resistance from … 28 MiG-15s from Antung intercepted the first formation of eight B-29s ... The escort fighters were unable to prevent the MiGs from firing high-speed passes on the bombers. The MiGs shot down two B-29s, and a third was severely damaged, forcing it to make an emergency landing at Suwon on just two engines.

 

“Later, four MiG-15s … became entangled with the escort fighters, and eight more MiG-15s intercepted the second formation of twelve B-29s … One of the bombers was shot down … and four B-29s were severely damaged, including one that landed in Korea.”

 

I was stunned by the losses, given that F-86s and F-84s were involved. Futrell’s explanation was,

 

“Not according to plan was a high rate of bomber aborts, which reduced the bomber force to 39 instead of 48 aircraft. The three bomber formations, moreover, strung out in the target area, compelling the (F-84) Thunderjets to split up and permitting the MiGs to concentrate their attacks against the weaker formations.

 

“Braving the Sabre top cover (which destroyed four enemy planes and damaged six others), the MiGs dived through the Superfortress formations from above, virtually ignoring the slower Thunderjets, whose bewildered pilots shot at anything with swept wings, MiGs and Sabres alike.”

 

“General Stratemeyer concluded that B-29s could not be flown in MiG Alley during daylight hours, and he banned further B-29 attacks on Sinuiju until an effective means of escort could be developed. The Thunderjets were deemed too slow and lacking in maneuverability to counter the MiG-15s, and Sabres were flown as escorts whenever possible. 

 

“As a result of ‘Black Thursday,’ B-29s did not attack the Sinuiju bridges again and did not fly in MiG Alley in daylight for six months. The attrition rate of the mission was too high, with the FEAF losing 25% of its total number of B-29s, far above the 10% loss rate deemed acceptable.”

 

It was a bad day for the B-29. However, B-29 gunners were credited with seven MiG kills. Sgt. Billy Beach, a right gunner, shot down two. His aircraft was badly damaged, made it to its target, and crash-landed at a forward fighter base, according to SMSgt Diboll. Sgt. Royal Veatch, a right gunner on another B-29, shot down one MiG. Sgt. Lyle Patterson, a Central Fire Control gunner, shot down one, as did SSgt. Robert Winslow, also a Central Fire Control gunner. SSgt Ercel Dye, a tail gunner, also shot down one, as did Sgt. David Stime.

 

Futrell noted that Sabre pilots said the MiG pilots were improving,

 

“They were aggressive and determined in pressing home attacks. They displayed good unit discipline and an increasing mastery of the four-ship flight in formations of up to 16 aircraft. The Red airmen covered each other so well in aerial fights on 16 and 18 April that the Sabre pilots were unable to claim any hostile planes destroyed.”

 

Thirty-six MiG-15s came out on April 22 and attacked 12 Sabres, flying their Yalu patrol, which were about to head home. However, a fresh 12 Sabres arrived on the scene, met the MiGs, shot down four, and damaged four.

 

B-29s struck the airfields during the day, and B-26s attacked at night during April. The timing could not have been better. The PLA launched a major offensive on April 22, and enemy forces could not use airpower against Allied ground forces. 

 

On June 1, F-86s accompanied a flight of B-29s and engaged 18 MiGs, shooting down two. Another group of B-29s flying without escort were attacked by 22 MiG-15s in the area of Sonchon. One B-29 was shot down. SSgt. James Davis, a tail gunner, shot down one MiG, and Sgt. Earl Kanop, also a tail gunner, shot down another.

 

Lt. General Otto Paul Weyland, in June 1951 the commanding general of FEAF, made this comment about the air situation when the truce talks began in July 1951,

 

“Unless our relative air strength here is maintained equal to or better than the Chinese Communist Air Force, I feel our expenditures of men and money in the Korean war have been in vain.”

 

In July 1951, Guererro reported that the number of MiG-15 encounters grew, forcing a significant fight for air superiority.

 

Weyland understood that non-Chinese pilots were flying the MiGs, but he also understood that the PLAAF was growing by leaps and bounds and making progress in establishing airfields in North Korea. Three airfields in China, known as the “Antung Complex,” could handle 300 MiGs. He asked that two fighter wings in Japan be deployed to Korea. They were there to defend Japan.

 

Futrell said Washington would not agree. He commented that General Nathan F. Twining, USAF vice chief of staff, “believed that the Sino-Soviet air force augmentation was mainly defensive.”

 

Futrell reported that Weyland’s requests for two more fighter wings “fell on deaf ears of USAF leaders who had no more air units to spare … The only source of Sabre aircraft was the USAF Air Defense Command, which was not up to strength and which could not safely be denuded of another of its fighter-interceptor wings.”

 

General Hoyt Vandenberg, the USAF chief of staff, is quoted by Futrell,

 

“The conditions under which an additional three F-86 squadrons would be greatly needed in FEAF might well be the same conditions under which these same three F-86 squadrons could make a greater contribution to the overall USAF mission in the air defense of the United States.” 

 

The Allies were plagued by the enemy’s building airfields in the DPRK, and it reared its ugly head again in September 1951. 

 

Futrell reported that on September 25, a “reconnaissance pilot noted that the enemy was building a new major airfield just north of the Chongchon River, near the town of Saamcham.” He said the field, with a 7,000 ft. strip, had gone unnoticed. Then, on October 14, reconnaissance flights saw three jet fighter airfields, “all within the radius of a 20-mile circle.” The other two airfields were at Namsi and Taechon, DPRK. AAA guns protected each airfield. The B-29s were tasked to attack them. 

 

On October 18, 1951, nine B-29s went to Saamcham and struck the runway. No MiGs challenged them. On the 18th and 21st, the bombers failed to meet their escorts and had to go to secondary targets. On October 22, nine B-29s hit Taechon. Their F-84 escorts were drawn off by 40 MiGs, and then three other MiGs slipped in to attack the B-29s. These MiGs hit a B-29, which headed out to sea and crashed. The crew bailed out and was rescued.

 

The bombing mission on October 23 was against the Namsi airfield and, according to Futrell, was “one of the most savage and bloody air battles of the Korean War.” Nine B-29s from the 307th Bomb Wing (BW) launched from Kadena AB, Okinawa, to attack Namsi, in the heart of MiG Alley, on this date. 

 

Earl J. McGill’s book, Black Tuesday of Namsi, “chronicles the calamitous B-29 daylight bombing missions … against Namsi Airfield. What many experts consider the epic air battle of the Korean War and perhaps the greatest jet engagement in the history of aerial warfare has largely become another forgotten battle in a forgotten war.”

 

Three flights of B-29s were on this mission from Kadena AB, “Able,” “Baker,” and Charlie,” each flight with three aircraft. Once the flight lead dropped his bombs, the others in his flight were to drop theirs.

 

The Free Library, Robert Futrell, and the Korean War Educator all address this “Black Tuesday” mission. I will draw from them. Again, keep the high F-86 screen and low F-84 escorts in mind. 

 

Thirty-four F-86s flew as a screening force north of the Namsi target area, between Namsi and the Yalu. Fifty-five F-84s flew low escort with the B-29s. The Free Library explains,

 

“Enemy fighters had overflown the F-86s and barreled right through the outclassed F-84s. With 248 aircraft swirling in the sky above Namsi, the largest single air battle of the Korean War had broken out over MiG Alley near the Yalu River.”

 

SMSgt. Randy R. Diboll reported that an estimated 100 MiGs attacked the F-86 screening force and pushed them away from the bombers. Futrell wrote,

 

“South of the Yalu, some hundred MiGs engaged and boxed in 34 Sabres of the screening force. The Sabres dropped two MiGs, but the American swept-wing pilots were effectively out of the action for the combat taking place to the south.”

 

This meant that the F-84 close escorts and the B-29 gunners were the primary defense against the MiGs, and in this case, not the F-86s.

 

Futrell paints a picture where “50 MiGs circled the (B-29) formation like Indians around a covered-wagon train … The MiGs bored in with determined attacks … The (F-84) Thunderjets (on close escort) were so badly outclassed that they could not offer too much protection. Most of the attacking MiGs flew normal pursuit curves, but some dived downward through the bomber formation to deny the Thunderjet pilots or the Superfortress gunners many opportunities to fire. One flight of MiGs came straight up under the B-29s with all guns blazing.”

 

Diboll said the 50 MiGs attacked nine bombers, quickly shooting down three and damaging five others. He said the enemy concentrated as many as 20 fighters on one bomber. “Able” and “Baker” flights each lost a bomber to the MiGs. Futrell said, “all but one of the bombers which survived the attacks received major damage, and most of them had dead and wounded men aboard when they made emergency landings in Korea and Japan.”

 

The Korean War Educator has a helpful accounting of the B-29s involved in the Namsi attack. This report tweaked my interest. 

 

Able Flight was led by Capt. Clarence Fogler, Jr. and included B-29s flown by Capt. James R. Lewis and Capt. Robert M. Krumm. 

• Folger’s aircraft landed safely, but on inspection on the ground, they found over 500 bullet holes. Sgt. Fred Spivey, a central fire control gunner on Fogler’s B-29, shot down one MiG. 
• The B-29 flown by Capt. Krumm was shot down by a MiG and was “last seen in a tight spiral” and crashing “on a mud flat near Namsi.” The remains of three were recovered from the crash site, and at least three were taken as POWs. Seven are listed as MIA.
• Capt. Lewis’ B-29 was damaged but was repaired. All hands returned safely from the mission.

 

Baker Flight was led by Lt. William “Bill” Reeter and included B-29s flown by Capt. James Foulks, Jr. and Major William R. Griner.

• Capt. Morton G. Edwards, the navigator on Lt. Reeter’s flight, was killed by an attacking MiG. Edwards crash-landed the B-29 at Kimpo. The remaining 12 survived despite the rough landing, though two were wounded.
• The B-29 flown by Capt. Foulks made it to the Yellow Sea. The 13-man crew aboard was able to bail out before the aircraft crashed, according to CBS News. An Australian destroyer picked up Lt. Fred Beissner, Jr. Cpl. Arthur G. Coffey’s body was recovered from the water. Five were captured, of whom four were released in a POW exchange in 1953. Foulks is listed as POW/MIA, but I have seen a report that said he died in captivity. Five others are listed as POW/MIA.
• Cpl. Paul Dickerson was the right gunner aboard Major Griner’s aircraft in Baker Flight and said,  “We took the shell in no. 3 main (fuel tank) and fuel started pouring out over the wing and down the right side over my blister. When the fuel went over the blister it made the blister milky … I could not see out of it anymore … I then went off interphone and took care of Lt. Thorton who had shrapnel in his arm. On landing we went off the side of the runway. Major Griner gave the crew the option to bail out. None did. Our CFC (central fire controller), SSgt. Slagowski got a MiG, confirmed by 4th FIW photos at debriefing.”
• Cpl. Dewell Turner was the left gunner. He said, “Paul Dickerson's account matches my recollection. I saw the tires blow out upon our landing when Major Griner locked the brakes to stop us. I also recall that a bomb hung up and had to be manually jettisoned before we landed. I think the bombardier and CFC did that chore. I saw the MiG go down after the CFC hit it. I remember the debriefers at Kimpo really pressed me about what I saw. Major Griner gave us the option of bailing out, but all the regular crew wanted to stay with the plane, probably because the radar operator was wounded and could not jump and they did not want to leave him. I wasn't about to jump alone. Everyone had great confidence in Major Griner and he did a fantastic job getting us down safely. The first thing the gunners did after landing was to clear the guns. When we looked for the lower forward turret cover to remount it after clearing the guns, we could never find it. No telling what happened to it. Someone probably thought it would never be needed again. They were right.”

 

Charlie Flight was led by Capt. Thomas L. Shields and included B-29s flown by Capt. Peter Dempsey and Major Don Field.

• Capt. Shields’B-29 was hit in the wing by attacking MiGs. The #3 engine was on fire. Futrell said he “held his burning bomber on course long enough to drop his bombs, thus fulfilling his duties as a (Charlie flight) leader.” The others in his flight also dropped their bombs. Shields “coaxed his bomber back to the coast, where his crew bailed out, but Shields did not get free from the stricken ship in time to save his own life.” Seven of the crew were able to bail out or were thrown clear of the aircraft. Of the 13 on the crew, four were rescued, Lt. James George Vretis was killed, and eight are listed as either MIA or MIA/POW.
• SSgt. Jerry Webb, a tail gunner on Capt. Shields’ aircraft shot down one MiG. 
• Capt. John Wagenhalls was the bombardier on Capt. Dempsey’s flight. He has written, “I was flying as Bombardier in the #2 position in C (Charlie) Flight and Peter Dempsey was the Aircraft Commander. . . From the battle damage we sustained it would be the most likely position in the formation. The bomb doors on the right side of the aircraft were shattered from cannon fire, while those on the opposite side suffered only minor damage. I was able to wire the pieces of the bomb bay doors in the up position sufficiently to allow us to fly the aircraft back to Kadena (Okinawa, Japan). Fortunately no one aboard the aircraft was injured in the melee. During and after the attack it seemed that the B29s were scattered, as not one of the flights remained intact. It was almost as if each airplane was on its own since at least one aircraft from each flight was destroyed almost immediately in the first attack. The (B-29’s) firepower effectiveness was severely reduced as no formation still existed. I believe we were the first crew to reach Kadena from Korea that fateful day. If the MiGs would have to continued their attack they could have shot us all down."

 

Capt. Don Field flew what was known as the “spare” aircraft, used when a regularly scheduled flight aborted due to engine trouble. I believe all hands made it home safely.

 

Altogether, three of the nine American B-29s were shot down and lost. Three received significant damage but were able to land at Kimpo. Two of these were so severely damaged they went to the depot for disposition. One was repaired and returned to duty. Three made it back to Okinawa safely. Six crew were KIA; 13 were captured and held as POWs, and 15 were listed as POW/MIA.

 

In sum, the B-29s took a beating that day. One F-84 was shot down. Four MiGs were destroyed, three by B-29 gunners and one by an F-84. Three other MiGs were damaged. The F-86s managed to shoot down two.

 

This was worrisome on several levels. The enemy had shown that it could and would dispatch overwhelming force against B-29 flights and their escorts. That again raised questions about how well the B-29 might do in general war against the USSR.

 

Sadly, the Namsi airfield was not neutralized, nor were Taechon and Saamchan. The enemy moved fighter aircraft to Sinuiju and Uiju across the Yalu in North Korea.

 

Daylight raids for the B-29 were scuttled. They switched to nighttime bombing only, which they did for the duration of the war.

 

General Vandenberg, the CSAF, said, “Almost overnight, Communist China has become one of the major air powers of the World. General Weyland, FEAF commander, said on December 2, 1951, that the enemy had a “capability of eventually attacking our (ground) forces.” The MiGs now held the initiative. 

 

What now, coach?

 

In October 1951, General Vandenberg sent 75 more F-86s with pilots to Korea. General Weyland agreed to return equal numbers of F-80 pilots and crew chiefs to the US and equipped two new squadrons with the F-86s. Furthermore, the 4th Wing sent all its F-86s to Korea instead of keeping some in Japan. The net effect, Futrell said, was that FEAF had 165 Sabres in Korea in December.

 

With Weyland's agreement, General Kelly at Bomber Command decided to send out the B-29s only at night using the SHORAN electronic navigation and bombing system using a precision radar beacon. They began in late November and pummeled the enemy airfields in North Korea.

 

Between December 2 and 4, 1951, the Sabres shot down 10 MiG-15s. On December 13, “the 4th Wing met 145 MiGs and destroyed 13.” They shot down three more during the month. 

 

I will stop this here and move on to a final episode: kill ratios.

 

 

F-86 vs MiG-15 Kill Ratios

 

This is the last issue I will discuss in this MiG Alley report.

 

If I have learned anything from this research, I’ve learned to take the numbers with a grain of salt. Figuring out F-86 to MiG-15 kill ratios is a good case in point. Since the Korean War, many assertions have been made about the kill ratios. That is, how many kills did an F-86 get compared to the MiG-15?

 

Thomas McKelvey Cleaver, a published aviation author, in his book MiG Alley: The US Air Force in Korea, 1950-53, wrote,

 

“Much of what has been recorded as ‘official history’ of the Air Force in the Korean War is little more than recycled wartime propaganda.”

 

Robert Futrell said it was 10:1. He wrote that Sabres destroyed 792 MiG-15s and lost only 79. That is, the F-86 shot down ten MiGs for every F-86 shot down. That 10:1 kill ratio held up in the public domain for many years.

 

The Planes of Fame Air Museum says, “At the end of the Korean War, Sabre pilots claimed 14:1 (later revised to 7:1) kill ratio over their opponents. Wikipedia says, “During the conflict the F-86 pilots claimed to have destroyed 792 MiGs in air-to-air combat for a loss of 78 Sabres – a phenomenal 10 to 1 kills-to-losses ratio.” 

 

The National Museum of the USAF agrees that the F-86 shot down 792 MiGs but has calculated the kill ratio at 8:1; that is, the F-86 shot down eight MiGs for every F-86 shot down by the MiG-15. That would mean that MiGs shot down 99 F-86s, a number I have not seen anywhere else.

 

The USAF reviewed its figures and reduced the ratio to 5:1. Michael Peck, a contributing writer for The National Interest, has written,

 

“Dildy and Thompson calculate 224 Sabres lost, of which about a hundred were the result of aerial combat. They estimate that 566 MiG-15s were destroyed by Sabres, which would put the U.S. kill ratio at about 5.6 to 1. However, against those top Soviet WWII pilots, the ratio plunged to 1.4 to 1.”

 

Capt. Richard Becker, the second USAF “MiG Ace” of the Korean War, has said,

 

“There was no 14-to-1 kill ratio when I was there. The guys we flew against were good, and they were as committed as we were. Every fight that I was in was decided by the guy in the cockpit who was better able to take advantage of the moments presented by luck. The MiG-15 was a dangerous opponent. We were very evenly matched and I am certain that overall in that first year, we fought them to a draw.”

 

Walter J. Boyne, a combat pilot and historian, a former director of the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution, and a Chairman of the National Aeronautic Association, has tried to put the debate to rest, saying, 

 

“Long believed in the West to have been a one-sided affair, the battle for the skies over Korea was in actuality one of the fiercest aerial conflicts of the 20th century. Of the many myths that emerged following the end of the Korean War, the prevailing one in the West was that of the absolute supremacy of USAF pilots and aircraft over their Soviet-supplied opponents. Exaggerated claims of success over ‘MiG Alley,’ the northwestern part of Korea where the majority of aerial fighting took place, saw, amongst many other fabrications, a 10:1 victory-loss ratio attributed to the USAF pilots flying the F-86 Sabre against their Communist adversaries in the MiG-15. Such claims would go unchallenged until the end of the Cold War when Soviet conflict records were finally opened.

 

“From that point onwards, a very different story began to emerge. Far from decisive American victories over an unsophisticated opponent, the aerial battles of the Korean War were, at least in the early years, evenly matched affairs, fought to an approximate 1:1 victory-loss ratio.

 

“Regardless of the validity or accuracy of Air Force claims of enemy aircraft shot down, or of aircraft lost in combat, one thing stands clear: despite being outnumbered by as much as 10:1 during 1951 and much of 1952, the Air Force was successful in maintaining air superiority over North Korea. No Red Air Force combat aircraft ever flew over the battlefield on the 38th Parallel during three years of war.”