Soviet Foxtrots: Cuban Missile Crisis
Loaded with nuke-tipped torpedos
Gotcha!
Nigel West, in his book, Historical Dictionary of Naval Intelligence, wrote,
"On October 30, the B-130 broke the surface alongside the destroyer USS Blandy 300 miles northeast of the Caicos Passage, having exhausted her diesel engines and taken advantage of the presence of the Gagarin and Komiles."
There is an excellent summary of the US contacts made with Soviet submarines in the "Chronology of Submarine Contact During the Cuban Missile Crisis," October 1, 1962 - November 14, 1962, edited by Jeremy Robinson-Leon and William Burr. I intend to describe only a few here.
Dobbs wrote,
"According to the Navy records, C-18/B-130 was first spotted at 11:04 a.m. on October 23 (1504Z) but it had evidently been picked up earlier by NSA (National Security Agency) electronic eavesdropping techniques."
CIA Director McCone told the NSC on October 23 that Soviet submarines had unexpectedly been found moving in the Caribbean.
B-130 was Captain Shumkov's boat. You will recall that when he was in the area of the Faroe Gap, Shumkov had an uneasy feeling that the US expected submarines to be in that area. That was about October 3, 1962. That Dobbs suggested the NSA might have picked up information about the submarines' transit "earlier" is most interesting and synchronizes with our earlier discussion of the Clarinet Bullseye HF/DF project. As it turns out, Dobbs comes right out and says the Navy had been tracking the Foxtrots ever since they left the Kola peninsula on October 1. He wrote:
"Electronic eavesdropper followed a flotilla as it rounded the coast of Norway and moved down into the Atlantic, between Iceland and the western coast of Scotland. Whenever one of the Foxtrots communicated with Moscow, which it was required to do at least one a day, it risked giving away its general location. The bursts of data, sometimes lasting just a few seconds, were intercepted by listening posts scattered across the Atlantic, from Scotland to New England, getting multiple fixes on the source of the signal, the submarine hunters could get a rough idea of the whereabouts of their prey."
So, those aboard the submarines who thought they might have been detected way back in the area of the Faroe Gap, appear to have been correct — Clarinet Bullseye caught them.
On October 24, 1962, the Commander Anti-Submarine Warfare Force Atlantic (COMASWFORLANT), Rear Admiral Elton W. "Joe" Grenfell, issued a flash message to Commander Task Group (CTG) 81.5, the Bermuda Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Group and other addressees including those in Washington that a naval CTG 81.5 aircraft reported contact with a probable submarine not US or known friendly. The aircraft reported a "snort" and provided coordinates, which placed it about 400 miles north of Puerto Rico and inside the blockade line. Navy people, especially the British, often refer to a snorkel as a "snort." CTG 81.5 was instructed to take this for action. CTG 81.5 assigned this sighting the “highest priority.” Patrol aircraft were tasked with locating the submarine. CTG 81.5 designated the contact as C-18 (B-130).
On October 25, 1962, Commander Task Group (CTG) 81.5 informed all hands involved in the search up to and including Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) that two members of a VP-45 patrol aircraft, "Woodpecker Nine" home-based in Bermuda saw a snorkel or periscope of a probable Foxtrot submarine, probably C-18 (B-130). A location for the sighting was provided. No photos were taken. The submarine immediately submerged. Surface units were instructed to proceed to the area and conduct a search.
I placed this sighting about 500 miles northeast of the Dominican Republic. Please note that my locations are very rough. Finally, the message reported that surface units of TG 136.2 had entered the area, prompting the patrol aircraft to depart.
The hunt was underway and was now in full swing as the submarine was spotted near Cuban waters. The Soviet submarine captains had not anticipated such attention, though deep down, they sensed they had been detected early on.
The message also said that Task Group (TG) 136.2 aircraft entered the area about an hour later and obtained “Madman.” “Madman” is USN terminology for the call of the Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) operator when his gear detects an undersea object, ostensibly a submarine.
A Magnetic Anomaly Detector is an instrument designed to detect minute variations in the Earth’s magnetic field.
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 75, "U.S. and Soviet Naval Encounters During the Cuban Missile Crisis," edited by William Burr and Thomas S. Blanton, discusses the submarine issue at length:
"During the missile crisis, U.S. naval officers did not know about Soviet plans for a submarine base or that the Foxtrot submarines were nuclear-armed. Nevertheless, the Navy high command worried that the submarines, which had already been detected in the North Atlantic, could endanger enforcement of the blockade. Therefore, under orders from the Pentagon, U.S. Naval forces carried out systematic efforts to track Soviet submarines in tandem with the plans to blockade, and possibly invade, Cuba. While ordered not to attack the submarines, the Navy received instructions on 23 October from Secretary of Defense McNamara to signal Soviet submarines in order to induce them to surface and identify themselves. Soon, messages conveying ‘Submarine Surfacing and Identification Procedures’were transmitted to Moscow and other governments around the world.
"The next morning, on 24 October, President Kennedy and the National Security Council's Executive Committee (ExCom) discussed the submarine threat and the dangers of an incident. According to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reviewed the use of practice depth charges (PDCs), the size of hand grenades, to signal the submarines, ‘those few minutes were the time of greatest worry to the President. His hand went up to his face & he closed his fist.’
“Within a few days, U.S. Navy task groups in the Caribbean had identified Soviet submarines approaching Cuba. They were tracking them with all the detection technology at their disposal.
"The U.S. effort to surface the Soviet submarines involved considerable risk; exhausted by weeks underwater in difficult circumstances and concerned that the U.S. Navy's practice depth charges were dangerous explosives, senior officers on several of the submarines, notably B-59 and B-130, were rattled enough to discuss firing nuclear torpedoes, whose 15 kiloton explosive yields approximated the bomb that devastated Hiroshima in August 1945."
At this point, the Navy has made contact with only one of the four Foxtrots. I believe this is a photo of the submarine, taken on October 25, the first one seen by USN surveillance to surface, at least the first one I can validate. This is a USN photo of B-130, hull number 945, Shumkov's boat. It is near the blockade line.
On October 26, an ASW aircraft visually sighted a submarine on the surface with “bare steerageway,” which I believe means “the minimum rate of motion relative to the water required for a ship or boat to be maneuvered by the helm.” The photos confirmed it was a Soviet Foxtrot hull, number 945, B-130, again, Shumkov. The report stated that the submarine was then closed, and she dove. She would surface again. She had been experiencing numerous mechanical failures with her diesel engines, a significant problem that the crew determined could only be repaired back in port. The Soviets dispatched a Pamir-class special tugboat to tow B-130 back home.
The ASW aircraft also obtained what is called a “lofargram,” which stands for Low-Frequency Analysis and Recording on paper, allowing analysts to determine the source of an acoustic sound. This report continued to refer to the submarine as C-18 because they believed they had a confirmation based on the hull number.
Again, on October 26, 1962, a VP-45 aircraft reported a Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) contact and identified it as Foxtrot C-19 (B-59), Captain Savitsky. You will learn later that B-59, unbeknownst to the US, posed a significant threat.
Reports continued to come in of submarine contacts and sightings, too numerous to list here. Sometimes a submarine would come to the surface; other times, only the snorkel was spotted; and plenty of times, the contacts went “cold.” Whatever the case, there was no question that Soviet submarines were in the Cuban area.
JCS summarized the contacts gained during the period from October 24 to October 27, 1962. The JCS concluded they had “four positive conventionally powered long-range submarines, three Foxtrots and one Zulu in the western Atlantic.” JCS said, “There is no contact evidence to indicate that nuclear-powered or missile-configured submarines are deployed in the Western Atlantic.” As you know, there were actually four Foxtrots. B-4, Ketov, was never seen on the surface, and I do not think she was ever detected.
October 27, 1962 has been called "Black Saturday" by some. Don North, writing "Warnings from the Cuban Missile Crisis," said, "'Black Saturday' was the day I arrived in Havana to report on the Cuban missile crisis, completely oblivious that 50 years later it would be considered 'the most dangerous moment in human history,' the day we came closest to nuclear Armageddon."
There was good cause for angst. Castro had urged Khrushev to use nuclear weapons against the US if the US invaded. Cuban air defenses were firing at US low-level reconnaissance flights. A Soviet missile shot down a USAF U-2. Another U-2 flying a polar mission overflew Soviet territory, prompting the Soviets to scramble fighters, which in turn prompted the US to scramble its own fighters. Nerves were frayed.
On October 27, the USS Beale (DD-471) was in the company of many other ships pursuing an unidentified submarine contact. It and other ships would make what they called “BT drops.” A "BT" is a bathythermograph, also known as a mechanical bathythermograph (MBT).
The Bathythermograph is a small, torpedo-shaped device that houses a temperature sensor and a transducer to detect changes in water temperature with depth, allowing for an understanding of how temperature layers can affect sonar accuracy.
Capt. John Petersen, USN (Ret.), was a lieutenant aboard the Beale at the time. He described the usual practice:
- The SOSUS system would detect the submarine.
- The information was passed to the patrol aircraft to localize the target area.
- Once these patrol aircraft started zeroing in on an area near the HUK Group, aircraft from the HUK Group would then pick up the target.
Once the SOSUS made contact, four destroyers from the HUK (Hunter Killer) group were detached and went to the target area. These destroyers surrounded the target, circling at about a range of 3,000 yards. They would have liked to stay at a greater range, but needed to be at 3,000 yards for their acoustics to work. The Beal then dropped three "grenades," later called "signaling charges." McNamara called them "practice depth charges."
A note here on these "grenades," which I think were practice depth charges. In its "After Action Report," the Soviet Northern Fleet Headquarters said the US ASW forces used "explosive sources … the blasts of which were possible to distinguish from the explosion of depth bombs. It is possible that depth bombs were used because three of the submarines suffered damage to parts of radio systems antennas, which made reception and transmission of information substantially more difficult." I will add that I have read that oftentimes, crewmen in the Soviet submarine were shaken by the sound and vibrations.
The Beale, along with other ships in HUK Group Alpha, made contact with the unidentified submarine, and the Beale moved to close sonar contact. The Beale dropped five hand grenades as a challenge to the submarine, but there was no response. Beale then challenged by sonar, again with no response.
Several hours later, the submarine surfaced and was identified as Soviet Foxtrot C-19 (B-59) (Savitsky), shown here, about halfway between Bermuda and the Dominican Republic. The aircraft made photo runs, and the Beale approached to within 500 yards on a parallel course to take more photos. No further action was taken.
The USS Cony (DD-508) was in the same group as Beale. She made sonar contact on October 27, as did Beale. She stayed within 3,000 yards of the contact, dropped five hand grenades, and observed the submarine surfacing. Cony identified the sub as “Korblx” B-59 (C-19), the same submarine as seen by Beale. Cony moved to within 100 yards for improved identification and then backed off to 3,000 yards.
The USS Bache (DD-470) was in the same group. Several ships continued tracking the submarine through October 28.
The USS Randolph (CV-15) aircraft carrier confronted B-59 (Savitsky). B-59 could tell that the USN force above had found them because B-59’s hydroacoustics could detect 14 ships following B-59, surrounding her, tightening their circle, and practicing attacks and dropping depth charges. Lt. Orlov said they exploded right next to their hull. I mentioned this once before, but to the sailors dropping these practice depth charges and grenades, the sounds and jolts appear to be nothing. But to the sailors aboard a submarine below, it was a different story. One's nerves could easily get stretched.
Orlov commented, "It felt like you were sitting in a metal barrel, which somebody is constantly blasting with a sledgehammer. The situation was quite unusual, if not to say shocking, for the crew."
Orlov also said:
"Judging by the events, they had not succeeded in discovering us. In any case, not until we reached the Sargasso Sea. There they got us. A naval forward searching aircraft carrier, Randolph, confronted submarine B-59."
Temperatures in B-59 were rising, as was the CO2 level. Sailors were fainting, “falling like dominoes.” Savitsky said the Americans kept up with the depth charges. He attempted to contact Moscow but was unable to do so. He summoned the special officer assigned to the nuclear torpedo and ordered him to assemble it and prepare it to be battle-ready.
Orlov quoted Savitsky screaming:
“Maybe the war has already started up there, while we are doing somersaults here. We’re going to blast them now! We will die but we will sink them all. We will not disgrace our navy.”
Savitsky then calmed down a bit, consulted with some others, including Second Captain Vasili Alexandrovich Arkhipov, shown here, and Deputy Political Officer Ivan Semenovich Maslennikov, and decided not to employ the nuclear torpedo, but instead rise to the surface. He ordered his men to signal they were coming up. B-59 was now the second Foxtrot to surface.
Arkhipov is said by many to be the man who stopped a nuclear war! Captain Ryurik Ketov (B-4) said: "Vasili Arkhipov was a submariner and a close friend of mine. He was a family friend. He stood out for being cool-headed. He was in control."
In a 40th Anniversary Conference on the missile crisis held in Havana in 2002, at which a video excerpt of Vadim Orlov's recollections was made, Orlov said a couple of intriguing things:
- On October 27, B-59 was discovered by planes and then established contact with the American forces above.
- Once B-59 surfaced, she was in "combat position. The torpedoes were ready, were in place, and after we saw that we had been discovered by a special group of ten destroyers and aircraft, and as a result we were forced…" I assume he went on to say B-59 had to capitulate.
In its "After Action Report," the Soviet Northern Fleet Headquarters said:
"When submarine 'B-59' came up to the surface, airplanes and helicopters from the aircraft carrier 'Randolph' flew over the submarine 12 times at the altitude of 20-100 meters. With every overflight they fired their aviation cannons /there were about 300 shots altogether/, and in the course of the overflight above the boat, they turned on their search lights with the purpose of blinding the people on the bridge of the submarine.
"Helicopters lowered floating hydroacoustic stations along the route of the submarine and dropped explosive devices, hovered over the conning tower of the submarine and demonstratively conducted filming. The destroyers maneuvered around the submarine at a distance of 20-50 meters demonstratively aiming their guns at the submarine, dropped depth bombs and hydroacoustic buoys when they crossed the course of the submarine, lifted flag signals and shouted in the loudspeaker demanding that the [submarine] stops. Similar actions were undertaken also in regard to submarine 'B-130.' ”
This is a photo of B-59, Savitsky's boat, on the surface with a USN helicopter hovering over her. The photo was taken on October 28, 1962, as she was returning to the USSR. She surfaced as her batteries had run low. On October 29, she submerged "without warning" and was not detected again.
The USS Charles Cecil (DDR-835) chased Dubivko's boat, B-36, hull number. 911. The USN knew he would have to surface at some point, so they stopped, turned off their engines, and set down their lights. The assessment was correct. On October 31, she surfaced to recharge her batteries in order to recharge her accumulators. Accumulators accumulate oil from the pump and create the oil pressure needed by the overall system. One source reported that the crew accomplished this, and Dubivko immediately took her down; to my knowledge, she returned to Murmansk undetected. Another source said Cecil followed her on the surface until November 2. In its "After Action Report," the Soviet Northern Fleet Headquarters said, "When submarine 'B-36' came up to the surface, the guns and torpedo launchers of the destroyer were opened and aimed at the submarine."
B-36 (Dubivko) was the third submarine to surface, and the last.
This is another view of where everyone was on October 27, 1962, as extracted from Hobbs’ book. You can see that B-4 and B-36 are inside the blockade boundary. B-4 is alone, while USS Cecil is not far from B-36, but not with it. B-130 and B-59 are outside, the former with the USS Essex and the latter with the USS Randolph by their sides.
B-4 (C-21/C-23) presented a different problem. There is some debate as to whether B-4 was USN C-23 or C-21. Some say she escaped detection, while others claim she was detected, and sonobuoys were dropped to her position. However, she was not brought to the surface.
I’ll pause for a moment to summarize the Foxtrot locations in late October 1962:
- B-59 (Savitsky) remained outside the Blockade Line, northeast of Cuba. The USS Randolph carrier was close to B-59.
- B-130 (Shumkov) did much the same. The USS Essex carrier was close to B-130.
- B-36 (Dubivko) was inside the Blockade Line on October 27, east northeast of Cuba, but was outside by October 29, northeast of Cuba.
- B-4 Ketov was inside the Blockade Line northeast of Cuba on October 27 and was thought to be just to the southeast of Jamaica on November 2.
Huchthausen presented a map on November 2, 1962, that showed B-4 south of Cuba and just south of Jamaica. Jan Drent, writing "Confrontation in the Sargasso Sea: Soviet Submarines During the Cuban Missile Crisis," said:
"The fourth Foxtrot, B-4, had made the quickest passage, going through the Windward Passage east of Cuba on 20 October, and was less than twenty-four hours from Mariel when ordered to take up a patrol position. Huchthausen said that B-4 retraced her passage back along the southern coast of Cuba and then used the Turks Passage through the eastern end of the Bahamas to return to the Sargasso Sea."
American ships continued to track the submarines through early November 1962. All were homeward bound.
Svetlana V. Savranskaya, writing "New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis," commented that when the four Soviet captains returned home, they were not greeted with any great enthusiasm. Their leadership accused them of failing at their mission, failing to maintain secrecy, and violating their orders. There was some fear initially that they would be punished. However, it has been learned their senior leadership did not realize they had employed the old Foxtrots, thinking instead they were sailing on Golf ballistic missile submarines. You'll recall the plan was to send Golfs after the Foxtrots, but the naval leadership felt it was too early for the Golfs to get that kind of test. Some Soviet military officers were irritated that the captains failed to employ their nuclear torpedoes. Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Minister of Defense, could not understand why they had to surface at all, and was upset they had violated their secrecy and been caught by the Americans.
I do not believe any adverse actions were taken other than what would typically happen to a senior officer who has lost the favor of his superiors.
It is arguable how many of the submarines were detected. Admiral Anderson wrote "all six diesel powered Soviet submarines in the area were detected, covered, trailed and surfaced." The Defense Department, however, said there were only five positive contacts, excluding the Zulu. Vice Admiral Alfred Ward, commander 2nd Fleet and Strike Fleet, Atlantic, supervised the blockade and stated that five positive contacts were made within the blockade boundary.
The submarines left for the USSR in late November 1962.
