Soviet Foxtrots: Cuban Missile Crisis
Loaded with nuke-tipped torpedos
Foxtrot transit
The four submarines proceeded from Sayda on the Kola Peninsula on October 1, 1962, one after the other in a column under the cover of a heavy fog. Foxtrot B-59 left first, followed by B-36, B-130, and B-4 in roughly 30-minute intervals.
The map to the right shows the general route the Foxtrots most likely took. The upper red arrow shows the location of their base on the Kola Peninsula. The bottom red arrow shows Cuba's location. I have not yet discussed the US naval blockade, but the blue arrow indicates the approximate blockade barricade line. T
That was a long transit for these Foxtrots, and their crews endured a most difficult voyage. It was October 1, and it would take nearly a Herculean effort, with no contingencies, and perfect seas to reach Cuba by October 20, as stipulated in their initial orders. The captains knew such a feat was almost impossible.
Please keep in mind that the US was unaware of this voyage when it was happening and would not have known the details, if at all, until the Soviets released the files in 1991. I will discuss later whether anyone in the US government was aware of the detection of the submarines. Most sources I have seen indicate that a Navy patrol aircraft sighted one of the Foxtrots north of the British Virgin Islands on October 24, 1962, although the CIA was aware of it as early as October 20. Keep this October 20 date in mind.
The Soviet captains think they were detected much earlier. I agree, and I will address why.
I will piece together the Foxtrot submarine transit from the Kola peninsula in the USSR to north of the British Virgin Islands and then on to Cuban waters in chronological order. I will also address US reactions.
Peter T. Haydon, a Senior Research Fellow at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada, specializing in naval and maritime security issues and Canadian defense policy, reminds us of the complexities involved. He wrote:
"The problem with the submarines is that no one, save the Russians of course, knows exactly how many Soviet submarines eventually took part in Operation 'Anadyr' or were already on patrol in North American waters in October and November 1962 … In 1962, ASW (anti-submarine warfare) was barely out of its infancy. Western navies were just beginning to understand the more complex aspects of sound propagation through water and the effect on sound propagation of temperature layers in the ocean … In retrospect … The evidence seems to say that there were certainly six submarines and possibly a seventh. We will not know for certain until the Russians open the Soviet Navy archive."
I will only report on the four Foxtrots and mention one Zulu-class attack submarine, an earlier diesel-powered boat that popped up.
Huchthausen commented in his book:
“Prior to 1962, Soviet submarine presence in the Atlantic was minimal, and their nuclear submarines had seldom deployed. Finding a Soviet submarine in those years took a lot of luck and a great deal of tenacity … Finding and locking onto a solid Soviet submarine contact in the 1960s was a rare event.”
The Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap is an important naval thoroughfare when departing the Norwegian Sea and entering the North Atlantic Ocean. It is an area located between Greenland, Iceland, and the Shetland Islands of the UK, forming a naval choke point. It is also referred to as the Faroe Islands Gap.
The USN began deploying maritime patrol aircraft to Naval Air Station (NAS) Keflavik, Iceland, in 1951 due to the significant expansion of the Soviet Navy. The US Commander, Barrier Force Atlantic, established its headquarters at Keflavik in the summer of 1961. Deployment of patrol squadron detachments, and later entire squadrons, started as early as 1951, with the P-2 "Neptune" leading the charge during this period. British and Norwegian patrol aircraft would also fly over this same choke point.
The Soviet submarines had a signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability to monitor US and allied voice radio traffic. This was most useful to the Soviets, who could monitor American Kevlavik and patrol aircraft communications.
Senior Lt Vadim Orlov was aboard B-59. He had spent many years in the US during his youth and had a good command of the English language. He commanded a special OSNAZ group, the first time in Soviet naval practice. OSNAZ, osobogo naznacheniya, is the official name of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) special purpose force, which I understand had heretofore been used mainly by the secret police for internal operations within the USSR.
Orlov’s team took advantage of Navy fliers who did not practice good communications security (COMSEC). Orlov has said these naval patrol aircraft encountered the Foxtrots very early in their voyage to Cuba.
The Foxtrots attempted to surface only at night. Even when surfaced, only about one-seventh of the submarine's pressure hull was above water. Rough seas struck the submarine flotilla quickly after they passed the Faroe Gap. Captain Dubivko (B-36), for one, felt the rough seas would disguise a visual sighting of his boat when surfaced and would cover the loud diesel engine noise, even when patrol aircraft dropped sonobuoys to pick up submarine noise.
Capt Dubivko (B-36) observed a USN P2V Neptune long-range patrol aircraft when he surfaced in the rough seas. His SIGINT operators warned him that one was in the area. The operators informed him that the P2V was from Naval Air Station (NAS) Keflavik and that it was headed toward their submarine, the B-36. While surfaced, his crew spotted P2Vs multiple times, flying on the same heading as the submarines were using. Dubivko worried the Americans had forewarning. According to Huchthausen's book, this event occurred on October 3, 1962.
Captain Ketov's crew (B-4) had intercepted similar communications. Ketov was also convinced the Americans had forewarning since the US and UK patrol aircraft were patrolling up and down the exact course, 225 degrees true, that the submarines were taking.
Peter T. Haydon reported Captain Ketov saying this:
"First, all detections of submarines in these regions were made by anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft while the boats were either snorkeling at periscope depth, or holding communications sessions while operating under electric motors. Second, all detections of submarines occurred during daylight hours. Third, the submarines were detected visually with the support ASW airplanes or helicopters sent to the region from shore-based command points or surface ships. Finally, the submarines that were forced to come to the surface submerged after having recharged their batteries and managed to break away from the US Navy's ASW aircraft and surface ships in pursuit, after which they were not detected anew."
Again, on October 3, Captain Savitsky's crew (B-59) intercepted communications from a U.S. long-range air patrol base, likely NAS Keflavik. Savitsky thought they had made it covertly to the Faroe Islands area, but now was unsure. I place the four Foxtrots somewhere in that area on or about October 3, 1962.
USN forces were ramping up their surveillance around this time. On October 2, Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered Admiral Robert Dennison, USN, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, to prepare to blockade Cuba. One immediate result was that the Navy stepped up its surveillance of the approaches to Cuba. American vigilance from this point on was very high.
Lt. Orlov's intercepts indicated that the Americans were looking for a half-dozen Soviet long-range diesel submarines. Orlov was certain the Americans had prior knowledge of their transit. He suspected they had been compromised by someone at Polyarny, the base from which they silently deployed to Sayda. Recall what I said about the CIA. It had agents everywhere.
The Soviet hierarchy believed they had passed through the "submarine barriers" between Newfoundland and the Azores Islands undetected. I, like the Foxtrot skippers, believe they were detected.
Peter T. Haydon wrote,
"The first indication of a higher-than-normal level of Soviet submarine activity in the North Atlantic came on October 13 when a submarine was sighted in the Caribbean … On 17 October, a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Canadair Argus patrol aircraft made contact with a possible Soviet submarine well to the West of the Azores, and contact was held for the next three days, but without getting proof of identity."
On October 13, 1962, A US Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) tanker, Yerkon, sighted a surfaced submarine 130 miles north of Caracas, Venezuela. Whether this was one of the four Foxtrots, I do not know.
It was now October 15, 1962. Orders from Moscow came by radio as a surprise to the Foxtrots, stating that there had been a change in the plan. They were ordered to go to the Sargasso Sea instead of to Cuba. The message read in part,
"The 69th Brigade of submarines will modify track … The brigade will deploy in a barrier due north of the entrance to Turks Island Passage and take up combat positions in the Sargasso Sea."
The “Sargasso Sea is a two-million square mile open ocean ecosystem, bounded by the circulating currents of the North Atlantic Gyre (circular pattern).” It lies north and northeast of the Turks and Caicos Islands and northeast of Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.
It appears that Moscow changed the order because the US had discovered the Soviet missile deployments to Cuba, and the situation was becoming "critical." So, the Foxtrots, instead of going to Mariel, Cuba, now faced the prospect of combat. Remember, each submarine had one nuclear torpedo, and the US did not know that.
Captain Shumkov (B-130) was a bit startled by the order to "take up combat positions." The Foxtrots had received no communication from headquarters since they left and had no idea what was going on. They did not know if they were at war, if so, against whom? Indeed, they had no full knowledge of Operation Anadyr when they left port on October 1, headed for Mariel. It's now October 15, and they had no idea what was happening outside, except that they knew those nuclear torpedoes were not loaded up for fun.
Captain Shumkov (B-130) could not stand being out of the loop, so he broke the rules. He directed his crew to take the boat up so he could get his high-frequency (HF) antenna above water. He wanted to listen to Voice of America (VOA), either in English or Russian, and find out what was happening in the world — was he at war?
It so happens that on October 15, 1962, the USN-USMC conducted a major amphibious exercise, PHIBRIGLEX-62. It was scheduled to run from October 15 to 30. More than 40 USN ships were underway on October 15. The assault was to be conducted on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, east of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Cuba. It was deigned to overthrow an imaginary tyrant named "Ortsac," Castro spelled backwards.
The important point for the Foxtrots was that there were now more than 40 ships in waters near Cuba, along with supporting aircraft and submarines. The Foxtrots had sailed into a hornet's nest, an unexpected hornet's nest. You will recall the Soviet admirals telling the captains before they left to expect very little USN ASW activity on their way to Cuba. That was wrong.
I believe that the four Foxtrot captains and crews were under immense pressure. They did not expect half the Atlantic fleet to be above them, they did not know what was happening in the outside world, they had these nuclear torpedoes aboard guarded by a non-submarine special officer, they knew almost nothing about those torpedoes, the captains had conflicting orders on how and when to employ them, and their boats had undergone a long and stormy voyage.
The submarines were jam-packed inside; they had to stay submerged for long periods, and the crews were tiring, sweaty, and often on the verge of fainting. Tempers were also short. The USN would not make life for them any easier, especially given the zest for chasing Soviet submarines among American sailors.
On October 20, the Navy Staff in Moscow ordered Dubivko to take the B-36 through the Caicos-Turks Passage but discontinue passage to Mariel. By this time, the Foxtrots had already passed through the Sargasso Sea, holding positions north of the Caicos-Turks Islands.
Huchthausen presents a great description of some events associated with Captain Dubivko and his B-36.
Dubivko knew that going through the Turks’ Passage was going to be a risky effort. The waters in the Passage were shallow. One wonders whether he was aware of the Navy's Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) site located on Turks Island. Dubivko was mindful of the USN presence in nearby Florida and anticipated a significant USN ASW effort in the area, including aircraft and destroyers. So, he decided to use a cargo ship heading toward the passage as cover. He intended to transit underneath the cargo vessel.
Dubivko was correct. There were hundreds of USN ships and patrol aircraft in the area, yet he did not know precisely why. He was already worried the Foxtrots had been detected earlier. But he had not expected the kind of USN effort he was seeing and about which his crew was hearing through its SIGINT intercepts. Dubivko kept his B-36 north of the passage and waited for the cargo ship. He intercepted the ship and, after some hard and tense work, got below her, just slightly behind her, keeping his boat in the ship's wake. Luckily, the cargo ship was not fully loaded, so her propeller broke the surface and made a nice wake for B-36.
The cargo ship suddenly stopped and dropped anchor. That was a surprise. Dubivko took his boat to the bottom and sat there, as he said, in the mud. His crew detected an American destroyer coming. The B-36 crew listened to the communications between the destroyer and the cargo ship and learned the ship was Norwegian, the Gretl. The destroyer was coming to see if she needed help, and then left, heading back to the north side of the passage. The ship hoisted anchor and pulled away, and B-36 stayed right with her. Dubivko broke away about 100 miles north of Haiti. That meant he had passed through the passage, so he headed west.
Then Dubivko (B-36) was ordered to reverse course and return through the passage to the north side to monitor USN activities. He found a Polish cargo ship heading in that direction and used it as cover to slip back through the passage. This event, back and forth through the passage, is curious. I do not know why Moscow ordered that.
Once in the Sargasso Sea, the Foxtrot crews had identified nearly all the USN ships operating in the region. Shumkov and B-136 were close by. The SIGINT efforts aboard the submarines enabled them to track the locations of USN ships and identify them. They were even able to stay on the edge of the USN's search patterns to avoid detection.
Captain Dubivko and his SIGINT crew were amazed at how undisciplined the American Navy was in its communications.
Finally, after listening to multiple news broadcasts, the Foxtrots learned that Anadyr had been compromised, the American Navy was in full reaction mode, and there was a plan in train to invade Cuba. They also discovered that President Kennedy had set up a naval blockade of Cuba. Captain Dubivko said listening to these broadcasts was the only way they knew that Kennedy had ordered a blockade and that the US was preparing to invade Cuba. Understandably, this put the Foxtrot captains more on edge; they viewed the USN's ASW forces as hostile threats.
I’ll insert here that CIA Director John McCone told President Kennedy on October 22, 1962, that four Soviet submarines were positioned to reach Cuba within a week. I have seen a report, but I cannot find it, that said CIA learned this as early as October 20. I’ll address how McCone might have learned about the Foxtrots’ heading to Cuba in the next section.
A USN P2V ASW aircraft spotted Foxtrot B-75 on October 22 and photographed her. She was not among the four Foxtrots discussed in this report. B-75 was refueling at the Soviet oiler Terek in the mid-Atlantic. After being refueled, B-75 then quickly returned to the USSR following Kennedy's announcement of the blockade. That's good, because B-75 was armed and may have had two nuclear warheads.
A P-5 Marlin Navy patrol aircraft from VP-49, the “Woodpeckers,” reported contact with a submarine on October 24, about 250 miles north of the British Virgin Islands. This submarine was subsequently identified as C-18 (USN designation), which translated to Foxtrot submarine B-130 (Soviet designation) (Captain Nikolai Shumkov in command). This resulted in stepped-up patrols searching for Soviet submarines.
I’ll stop here. I mentioned that CIA Director John McCone informed President Kennedy about the Foxtrots on October 22 and may have been aware of them as early as October 20. The question is, how did he know this?
On October 23, 1962, US Secretary of Defense McNamara said that about 25 Soviet cargo ships were moving towards Cuba, and the US imposed a blockade.
As a result of McCone’s warning, on October 22, Admiral George Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), warned fleet commanders to prepare for possible submarine attacks, saying,
“I cannot emphasize too strongly how smart we must be to keep our heavy ships, particularly carriers, from being hit by surprise attack [sic] from Soviet Submarines. Use all available intelligence, deceptive tactics, and evasion during the forthcoming days. Good luck.”
Anderson went further on October 22, demonstrating his deep-seated sense that the Soviets had sent submarines. The Navy History and Heritage Command wrote this:
"(The CNO) was particularly wary of the submarine menace. His early belief that Cuban contingency operations would result in increased Soviet submarine activity, particularly in the Caribbean, was borne out during the entire operation. He had directed special emphasis on submarine intelligence measures and received at least three status briefings a day, and often many more, so as to keep intimately informed on the worldwide submarine picture. To expand submarine intelligence capability, he solicited the assistance of the United Kingdom and Canadian Navies with: 'Although I am unaware of what the future political environment may be, I would greatly appreciate your giving us maximum intelligence support concerning potential undersea troublemakers. We have a big job to do and can use all the help we can get.’"
On October 22, 1962, a B-52 heavy bomber was ordered to fly surveillance of the Soviet freighters Gagarin and Komiles because they were nearing the blockade line. They flew out of Loring AFB, Maine, and easily found the two ships. However, Bill Hinterthan, a superb Bomb Nav Radar operator, said he had something odd: a strong radar return in the close vicinity of the two ships, and it was proceeding with the ships. The crew concluded it could only be a Soviet submarine.
This seemed to lend credence to McCone’s warning of October 20 that Soviet submarines might be transporting nuclear warheads to Cuba. But how did McCone know what he said he knew?
