Svalbard and the Bear Island Gap

I confess I was unaware of the Svalbard-Bear Island Gap until I started paying attention to the Arctic thaw and the resumption of testy relations among the US, NATO, and Russia. 

My first challenge was to locate Svalbard. It is either not shown on maps or you have to zoom in to find it.

The Svalbard Archipelago lies in the Arctic Ocean, north of the Arctic Circle, about halfway between mainland Norway and the North Pole. Many maps do not show it. It is part of the Kingdom of Norway. Longyearbyen is its capital, just 800 miles from the North Pole.

Russia has laid claim to the archipelago. About 15 percent of the nearly 3,000 residents are of Russian origin. NATO included it in its defense area, which ruffled Russia. Another source of irritation for Russia is the abundance of oil in the 200-mile economic zone around Svalbard.

I’ll highlight that Bear Island is the southernmost point of the archipelago. It lies about 260 miles south of the Svalbard capital, Longyearbyen. 

Most importantly, Bear Island is at the southern end of the Svalbard Archipelago between the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea.

Kristian Atland has said, 

“(The Bear Gap) serves as a key gateway for naval movements and maritime surveillance in the High North.

“Russia views this maritime area as integral to its so‑called ‘Bastion Defence’ strategy. In order to ensure the safe operation of the Northern Fleet’s ballistic missile submarines in the inner part of the bastion, that is, in the Barents Sea, Russia wants to be able to control the Bear Island gap.”

Norwegian Defence Minister Tore Sandvik has forewarned that Russia has its eye on the Bear Gap corridor from the Barents Sea. He is particularly worried about Russia employing hypersonic missiles against Britain, Norway, and Denmark. Minister Sandvik said,

“We see what kind of weapon systems Russia is developing, and we know that if they can control the Bear Gap, they can also use hypersonic missiles against NATO … against London, against Norway, against Denmark. They are developing weapon systems, which tells us that we cannot let them control the Bear Gap.”

Russia does not yet exert control over the Bear Gap corridor. It is debatable whether NATO controls it as well.

The Svalbard Archipelago has no military installations, though the Norwegian Coast Guard is tasked with surveilling surrounding waters.  Norway’s Evenes Air Station is about 400 miles south, about an hour’s flight for the P-8 Poseidon ASW aircraft, and about 700 miles northeast of the GIUK Gap.

The archipelago’s geographic position makes it a potential bottleneck for the Russians. Furthermore, Svalbard’s historical ties to Russia and its position in the Arctic present challenges for Norway and NATO.

Two separate undersea cables connect Longyearbyen to the Norwegian mainland, providing internet access. The fiber-optic cables, among other things, connect Svalbard and the satellite station there to the mainland. 

The satellite station is the world's largest commercial satellite ground receiving station and the world’s only commercial ground station capable of supporting polar-orbiting satellites on every orbit around Earth. It is a critical station. It is part of the Landsat 8 and 9 US Geological Survey (USGS) Network and sends its data to its primary archive in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.

In January 2022, one of the two subsea cables broke, causing a loss of signal. The signal was restored about two weeks later, but the cause of the break remains unknown. There was speculation that Russian trawlers had severed the cable, but no supporting evidence has been found.

This incident in the Norwegian Sea in January 2022 was followed by another in the Baltic Sea in 2023. Concern has been growing that hybrid warfare is being waged in the undersea battle-space. In 2025, NATO began Baltic Sentry operations to monitor the Baltic Sea and counter such hybrid warfare. In February 2026, NATO began Arctic Sentry to monitor the High North in a similar fashion.

The Truman National Security Project has said,

“The seabed is no longer a passive frontier; it is a contested battlespace central to 21st-century geopolitics. Russia and China recognize the leverage afforded by undersea infrastructure, particularly in the Arctic, where geography and technology converge to create both opportunity and vulnerability.”

Norway’s NorSat-3 satellite system can monitor Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals to track ship traffic along Norway’s coast. Military ships are not required to use AIS and often do not. NorSat-3 advocates say it can detect ships not transmitting AIS and that Norwegian maritime authorities can monitor all ships around Svalbard and even in the Northwest Passage.

The Russian Nagurskoye air base in the Arctic, mentioned earlier, is only about 430 miles east of Longyearbyen. It is said to be operational year-round and capable of handling any aircraft.

Geopolitical Intelligence Services (GIS) has said,

“Strategic-military interests are overtaking economic interests in Russia’s thinking about the Arctic … The Kremlin is highly alert to any suggestion that Svalbard could be used to weaken its position in the Barents Sea and its strategic nuclear deterrent. This concern has intensified since Finland’s accession to NATO.”

By treaty, Svalbard cannot be used for military purposes. However, GIS has reported that Russia plans to build a satellite ground station in Svalbard to receive surveillance and reconnaissance satellite data.

About 300 Russian nationals live in Barentsburg, a coal-mining town said to be the second-largest settlement in Svalbard. GIS reported that the mining operation is unprofitable, but Russia likes to maintain it “on NATO territory.” Some assert that Russia is waging an information warfare campaign and that Russians living in Svalbard are “radicalizing to dangerous levels.”

James Anderson, writing for the US Naval Institute, has said that the Russians held a WWII Victory Day military parade on Svalbard in 2023. The Russian mining company planted three Russian flags on Svalbard in 2024 and, in 2025, deployed a vehicle resembling a Russian police car on the island.

The Russian Arctic Scientific Expedition (RAE-SP) is a year-round effort that uses Barentsburg as its expedition and logistics base. A remote satellite receiving and transmitting station is located in Barentsburg. Although the mining operation there may be unprofitable, the Svalbard Research Office has noted that the research facilities in Barentsburg have been upgraded in recent years.

James Anderson commented,

“The Kremlin’s campaign to undermine Norway’s sovereignty over these strategic islands has continued for decades. The archipelago is vulnerable to such pressure in part because of the unique nature of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty … The treaty permits signatories to establish settlements on the islands.”

A note on the Gray Zones

In closing, I will note that Information Warfare plays an important role in everything I have discussed so far. The Atlantic Council has suggested,

“US adversaries are increasingly pursuing their national objectives in a little-understood arena: the so-called ‘gray zone’ between peace and open conflict.”

That said, Borislav Bankov has written,

“Hybrid warfare (HW) is one of the most debated concepts in contemporary military science. While most scholars agree that HW is conducted in the gray-zone between war and peace, they define the phenomenon differently. This disagreement has resulted in a conceptual gray-zone.”

So, the gray zone is there, but it is quite gray, replete with ambiguity.

Gray zone actions are often referred to as hybrid threats. These are a few examples,

• Information warfare
• Target independence movements in Greenland, Scotland, and Svalbard.
• Cut undersea and internet cables
• Use proxies
• Armed violence short of armed conflict
• Electronic disruption and cyber operations
• Fishing vessels within economic zones
• Election meddling
• Use of sanctions and other economic coercion

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