‍MV Ocean Trader: SOF floating lily pad

‍Special Operations barracks, command center, staging base

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‍Introduction

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‍Beginning in August 2025, the US began deploying an air and naval armada to the Caribbean Sea with enormous lethal power, and there is more coming. The USS Gerald Ford has departed the Mediterranean Sea and is in the Caribbean area.

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‍PBS reported on October 21, 2025, that the US Navy had “eight warships in the region — three destroyers, three amphibious assault ships, a cruiser and a smaller littoral combat ship that’s designed for coastal waters.” The USAF has sent MQ-9 drones, and the AC-130J gunship to Puerto Rico, and B-1 and B-52 bombers have flown over the area. The Marines have deployed a squadron of F-35 fighters to Puerto Rico, and a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is also deployed as part of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). US Special Forces are also in the area.

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‍Street talk says the US is preparing to invade Venezuela to depose President Maduro, who the US claims is a drug trafficker.

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‍Whatever happens in this region will happen regardless of anything I write. But there is one ship deployed to the Caribbean that has caught my attention, the MV Ocean Trader. 

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‍The US Military Sealift Command (USMSC) confirmed on September 25, 2025, that the Ocean Trader is operating in the Caribbean. The New York Times reported on October 17 that she was there, and that a guided-missile cruiser was with her, probably as a defender. The Times went further and pointed out that s “Special forces ships and guided missile cruiser” were seen on October 15, 2025 close to eastern Venezuela.

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‍The Ocean Trader often does not activate systems that would allow her to be tracked, so I do not know for sure whether she is still there.

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‍The MV Ocean Trader is a Special Warfare Support vessel designed for Special Operations Forces (SOF). Some have referred to her as a SOF Mothership. I was not aware of her existence, but I now think of her as a floating forward staging base for special forces. The US MSC operates the ship. 

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‍I learned of the Ocean Trader after following up on a New York Times story published on October 22, 2025, that said,

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‍“The strikes this week were the eighth and ninth known boat attacks that U.S. Special Operations forces have conducted since the operation began in early September, and brought the officially acknowledged death toll to 37.”

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‍Up until then, I had assumed USAF and Navy drones were conducting the attacks, so learning that SOF was conducting them surprised me. That led me to the MV Ocean Trader, a ship I knew nothing about.  

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‍Once I began to learn more about this ship, I was able to tie in a few new and old trinkets of knowledge that I had obtained while researching the Ocean Trader and other subjects.

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‍MV Ocean Trader

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‍To start, note that the Ocean Trader is called a Merchant Vessel, MV, rather than the USS, signifying she is a naval combatant. This is because the MSC operates her in support of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) requirements.

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‍Several sources for information about the ship assert the Navy does not “own” the ship, but rather leases it from the Maersk Line, a Danish container company. I suspect the lease, if one exists, is with Maersk Line Ltd., of Norfolk, Virginia, a US company that supports the requirements of the US government and operates US-flag vessels.

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‍The Navy contracted Maersk Line in November 2013 to convert the merchant ship MV Craigside, launched in 2010, to serve as a SOF vessel and named her the MV Ocean Trader. It can carry a crew of 50 civilians and 159 SOF, support them for over a month, and attain a speed of 20 knots. 

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‍She can be refueled at sea and can handle rotary wing aircraft up to the size of the MH-53E Super Stallion, including Apache Gunships, Navy Patrol helicopters, and Marine and Air Force V-22 tiltrotors. The Navy’s requirement also listed the CH-47 Chinook and UH-60 Blackhawk.

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‍It can launch and recover small boats from its four bays, and it can launch and recover unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It also has a special compartmented information facility (SCIF) on board to discuss special intelligence, hosts multiple sensors such as electro-optical, search radar, and, I assume, signals intelligence (SIGINT) receivers. It has significant communications capabilities.

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‍Michael Fabey, a naval analyst with Janes, has said her “main role is to serve as both barracks and command center for special operations forces.” The Ocean Trader has been spotted in the Mideast region and is now in the Caribbean, apparently serving with the Naval armada deployed there.

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‍Retired Navy Captain Bradley Martin has said, ”The ship is intended to blend in with merchant traffic.”

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‍Launching and recovering small boats includes the Naval Special Warfare rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) and the combat craft assault (CCA) fast boat.

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‍Several of the Ocean Trader’s capabilities are relatively new, having been developed in the last 10 years or so, and are not widely known.

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‍The crew does not advertise the ship’s whereabouts and often does not appear in widely used Automatic Identification Systems (AIS). The AIS is a tracking system used by ships to broadcast identity, location, course, speed, and other safety-related information to other ships and to shore-based authorities.  The Ocean Trader has been spotted in Fremantle, Australia, Oman, the Mediterranean, and now in the Caribbean.

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‍I did not know about the MV Ocean Trader until recently. The evolution that has taken the US to the fielding of this ship is absorbing. I have, over the years, researched military basing developments and can see how we got here from there. I’ll point out a few examples.

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‍USS Ponce

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‍The USS Ponce (LPD-15) was an Austin-class amphibious transport dock. She was launched in 1970 and served in several conflicts. The Navy intended to decommission her in 2012, but decided to use her as a testbed for the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) Interim concept. The idea was to use her in concert with MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters for minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf. 

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‍The Navy has said,

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‍“The Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, in cooperation with the Military Sealift Command, coordinated efforts to provide Ponce as a response to a U.S. Central Command request for an afloat forward staging base to conduct a variety of in-theater sea operations. After successful implementation, Ponce remained in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations, providing a platform capable of completing a variety of missions, including humanitarian relief, special operations, mine countermeasure operations, and serving as a command and control asset.”

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‍The War Zone website has said the requirement emerged from an urgent request from General James Mattis, the commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), for a forward floating staging base to support operations in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf region. The Navy had been toying with this kind of idea since WWII, according to The War Zone website.

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‍The Special Operations Command (SOC) had also been seeking a transportable floating base for several years.

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‍Her flight deck could accommodate six CH-46 Sea Knight amphibious transport helicopters or three CH-53 helicopters and could handle landing or takeoffs of two helicopters simultaneously. naval-technology.com has said the “deck can also support the landings of vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft, such as AV-8B Harrier II under VFR (Visual Flight Rules) conditions.”

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‍The Ponce was operated jointly by the MSC/Navy crew and operated from Bahrain. She spent about five years as a floating base in the Arabian Sea area.

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‍She was the first to employ a laser weapons system (LaWS). The Naval History and Heritage Command has written,

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‍“The LaWS could be directed onto targets from a radar track obtained from a Mk 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) or another targeting source. That capability provided Navy ships a method for sailors to defeat small boat threats and aerial targets without using bullets.”

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‍Her flight deck had space for up to six CH-46 helicopters. She had a crew of 24 officers, 396 enlisted, and a Marine detachment of 900 Marines. Ponce carried two 20 Phalanx automated Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), two 25mm Mk 38 guns, and eight .50-caliber machine guns. She also carried Scan Eagle drones for reconnaissance and surveillance.

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‍Marine Corps Brigadier General Francis Donovan, commander of the Marine 5th Expeditionary Brigade, reportedly told the ship’s crew that the ship served as a “proof of concept of innovative warfighting operations.” Her “rebirth” was seen as a stopgap measure. The Navy was in a hurry and sought one no-bid contract for something new, which was to be the Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) series of ships.

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‍The USS Ponce was decommissioned in 2017.

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‍USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB-3)

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‍The USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB-3) became the first purpose-built expeditionary sea base (ESB) and then a mobile afloat forward staging base. She replaced the USS Ponce.

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‍The Navy contracted for six of these Lewis B. Fuller Class ESBs to be built by the National Steel and Shipbuilding Co. (NASSCO), a division of General Dynamics, 

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‍USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3), Manama, Bahrain

‍USS Hershel 'Woody' Williams (ESB 4), 6th Fleet

‍USS Miguel Keith (ESB 5), 7th Fleet

‍John L. Canley (ESB 6), 7th Fleet

‍Robert E. Simanek (ESB 7)

‍Hector A. Cafferata Jr. (T-ESB 8), under construction

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‍The Puller crew consists of five naval officers, 96 enlisted sailors to operate the flight deck and support operational detachments, and 44 civilian mariners from MSC to operate and maintain the flight deck and engineering spaces.

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‍She is capable of supporting multiple missions, including Air Mine Counter Measures (AMCM), counter-piracy operations, maritime security operations, humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions, and U.S. Marine Corps crisis response. Puller will also support MH-53 and MH-60 helicopters, MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft, and the H-1 helicopter fleet, which includes the AH-1Z Viper and UH-1Y Venom, used for close air support, armed escort, and utility missions.

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‍The Marine Times reported that the “Puller has the third-largest flight deck in the Navy — after aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships — from which four CH-53 helicopters or MV-22s can operate at a time.

‍It can also launch small boats or unmanned surface vehicles from its mission deck, and has a unique modular design so it can be reconfigured.

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‍While in Bahrain, the Puller has been assigned to the Naval Amphibious Force Task Force 51/5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, known as 51/5.

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‍I’ll note that the Navy also contracted for two Expeditionary Transfer Docks (ESD) capable of large-scale logistics movements from sea to shore. Defense Industry Daily has said, 

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‍“They’re intended to serve as a transfer station or floating pier at sea, improving the U.S. military’s ability to deliver equipment and cargo from ship to shore when friendly bases are denied, or simply don’t exist.”

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‍They are part of the new class of ships added in 2015 with an E as a new designator for sea-basing ships. ESD-1 is the USNS Montford Point, delivered in 2013, and ESD-2 is the USNS John Glenn, which was delivered in 2014. The numbering system then switched over to the ESBs, starting with the Puller, ESB-3.

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‍The ESDs can carry three Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) vehicles. Each ESD can launch two LCACs simultaneously from the stern. These can carry heavy equipment such as Humvees and Abrams tanks and deliver them to the shore.

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‍My mind, being what it is, sees the MV Ocean Trader, dedicated to SOF, and the Navy ESBs and ESDs as mobile afloat forward staging bases or what I would call “Floating Lily Pads.” Let’s talk a bit about the US Lily Pad Strategy.

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‍Lilly Pad Strategy

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‍I have done considerable research into the US military presence in Africa: “What’s the US military doing in Africa?” I thought that was a good question, so I began researching to find an answer.

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‍I’ve thus far addressed the “Floating Lily Pads.” Let’s now switch to how this idea translates to land-based operations.

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‍The military motivations is that it prefers to avoid having bases abroad.

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‍Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in office from 2001 to 2006, pushed for a more austere concept for hosting military facilities abroad called “cooperative security locations (CSLS).” His successor, Robert Gates, latched on to this as well. 

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‍The idea was to establish discreet and cost-effective sites characterized by a small footprint, typically positioned where they are most needed.

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‍The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has four main designations for the facilities where it deploys personnel overseas, listed in descending order of size and infrastructure,

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‍Main Operating Bases (MOB)

‍Forward Operating Sites (FOS)

‍Cooperative Security Locations (CSL)

‍Contingency Locations (CL)

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‍SOF might have a list of locations they’ll use, such as landing zones (LZ) and drop zones (DZ), and they might have planned ingress and egress routes, stop-off points, etc. Their activities are almost always clandestine and involve small numbers of troops. They often operate at great distances from supporting bases and utilize aircraft for insertion and extraction. If the system is working, the whereabouts of these SOF on any given day is anyone’s guess.

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‍I have been discussing the Caribbean area, so let’s stick with that. A paper was prepared for Congress, “U.S. Overseas Basing: Background and Issues for Congress.” It contains a diagram pointing to two CSLs in the Caribbean, CSL Reina Beatrix International Airport, Aruba, and the other at CSL Hato International Airport, Curacao. There is also CSL Comalapa in El Salvador. Also note Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras, used by the US Joint Task Force-Bravo.

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‍These fit with the desire to use facilities abroad without establishing bases. The US military likes using host-nation bases or be co-located with host-nation airports to minimize visibility and obtain the required storage. 

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‍CSLs are not bases. Few or no US personnel are usually present, and those who are there are almost always temporary. CSLs are primarily logistics sites that stock pre-positioned logistical equipment to support military operations should they be required. Good generals study tactics. Great generals study logistics.

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‍A CSL is a location that US personnel can use to support a wide range of contingencies when needed and with the permission of the partner country. People of all stripes, especially journalists seeking sensationalism,  might call them bases, but by definition, they are not.

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‍The “Lily Pad Strategy” is an idea that was actually developed by business interests that were looking for a “soft place to land,” a friendly, partnership-oriented environment.

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‍Newry, a Cleveland, Ohio-based growth strategy firm, defines the lily pad strategy applied to business enterprises,

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‍“Establish a vision, plot a path of relatively low-risk, low-investment, high-learning steps.” 

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‍Newry adds,

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‍“In the course of progressing from the lily pad to lily pad, the company develops market knowledge and competitive advantage without ever having to face the exposure involved in swinging directly for the fences, and stands a much greater chance of reaching their end goal unscathed.

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‍“If things do not go as well as expected, rest on the current lily pad and replot your course. If things go badly, retreat to the previous lily pad.If things go unexpectedly well, accelerate your hopping or jump over some lily pads to achieve the vision even more quickly.”

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‍The Air Force is dealing with these issues at its Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources Base (BEAR Base) at Holloman AFB, New Mexico. Lt. Col. Rebecca Corbin said it this way,

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‍“If we can go to a place with just a runway and some water, we can build you a base. I want people to know that we bring the initial setup capability, we bring to the fight.”

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‍Nicholas Gvosdev of the Foreign Policy Institute, 

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‍“(Alfred Thayer Mahan’s notion had to do with) projecting power across trans-oceanic regions (and) controlling key maritime ‘choke points’ both to prevent hostile powers from accessing the main ocean avenues to the United States and for the US to have points of egress (in modern parlance, ‘lilypads,’ to reach key regions, especially to defend US business interests).”

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