‍Deep Sea 129: The price Silent Warriors pay

‍“Our conduct in the EC-121 crisis was weak, indecisive and disorganized”

‍Henry Kissinger

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‍Introduction

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‍On April 15, 1969, a North Korean MiG-21 shot down a US Navy EC-121M, callsign “Deep Sea 129,” electronic surveillance aircraft assigned to Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One (VQ-1), Atsugi, Japan, BuNo 135749, c/n 4316. She was shot down over the Sea of Japan about 100 nm off the coast of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea, in international waters. There were 31 American souls aboard, all lost, only two bodies recovered. The EC-121 was unarmed and had no escort. She was flying out there alone, just as so many others had done and still do.

The US, with President Richard Nixon at the helm, did not retaliate. The purpose of this story is to try to understand why. 

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‍This was a planned ambush attack. The North Koreans had moved two MiG-21s from Pukch'ang-ni Airfield in the west to Hoemun-Ni Airfield in the east 18 days before the shoot-down. The deployment base at Hoemun-Ni was a MiG-15/17 training base, not a tactical air base. The EC-121 crew was not briefed on this deployment, a grave omission.

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‍I will provide details on the shoot down at the end of this report. I first want to explore US decision-making at the highest level. From where I sit, there was a lot of flailing about by President Nixon and his top advisers, but no counteraction in response.

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‍The USAF and USN had flown 190 similar missions from January through March 1969, forty-nine of which were Navy VQ-1 reconnaissance flights, and there had been no hostile North Korean reaction. Risk assessments considered a hostile intercept action unlikely.

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‍I lost an aircrew after the North Vietnamese shot down an EC-47 electronic reconnaissance aircraft over Laos about a week after the Paris Peace Accords took effect, eight souls lost. There was no retaliation for that either, and the lack of action has always stuck in my craw, so I confess to having a bias here.

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‍Let’s explore what the “Suits” did and did not do in response to this EC-121M shoot down. Keep in mind, we lost 31 souls. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) highlighted that there were two issues: freedom of international airspace and the “right to gain redress of the wrong against a US aircraft and its crew.” It is this latter point that annoys me a great deal.

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‍The “Suits” 

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‍President Richard Nixon had just taken office on January 20, 1969. Based on all the research I have done, Mr. Nixon was personally involved in the attack against Deep Sea 129 from the beginning until the end. 

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‍He was highly concerned about the loss of the 31 crew, he was adamant about taking military action, and he was angry that the US seemed to have its hands tied against North Korea.

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‍To underscore the environment in which the EC-121 crew flew, Richard Mobley, in his book Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 crisis, noted that a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) of September 1967 highlighted that “since October 1966, North Korean infiltrators had initiated far more violent activity against US and ROK forces along the DMZ than at any time during the preceding ten relatively peaceful years. The SNIE portrayed North Korea as an independent actor in its game of increased violence toward the South.”

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‍But the SNIE concluded North Korea did not want war. Increased tensions were just fine, but no desire for war.

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‍The SNIE said North Korea would not invade the South and would not attempt to provide a resumption of significant hostilities. The bottom line was that the DPRK would engage in as many hostile actions as it thought it could get away with, such that it would not provoke all-out war.

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‍As a result, in February 1969, Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s National Security Advisor, directed that an Interagency Planning-Programming-Budgeting Study be set up in September 1968 and have its completed report done by May 1969. 

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‍He asked that the study group closely coordinate its work with the National Security Council (NSC), no doubt because Nixon and Kissinger had just come on board, and Korea was important to them. 

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‍The ROK ambassador to the US, Kim Dong Jo, met with Secretary of State William Rogers in Washington on March 9, 1969. 

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‍The ambassador was, among other things, interested to know how the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam were progressing, whether the US was refocusing on Europe and away from Asia, and whether the US had planned on increasing security commitments in Asia. On this latter point, Rogers said the US had no such plans.

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‍ROK Prime Minister (PM) Chung Il Kwon met with President Nixon in Washington on April 1, 1969. Nixon asked for an update on developments in Korea. The PM said the DPRK was militant, trying to stir up trouble in the ROK, and was trying to provoke dissidence in the ROK in multiple locations, as the North Vietnamese had been doing in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). He expressed some concern that the US would back away from its forward defense and suggested actions the US ought to take to keep its forward defense strong. He said it would be a political disaster if the US withdrew forces. 

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‍The PM met with Secretary Rogers on April 2 and reiterated what he told President Nixon, though in much more forthright terms.

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‍The EC-121 was shot down on April 15. The JCS prepared a paper analyzing possible courses of action that same day. The JCS said there were two issues at stake: freedom of international airspace and the “right to gain redress of the wrong against a US aircraft and its crew.” The JCS said that, as of yet, the US had taken no actions.

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‍The JCS paper said the US was prepared now to do the following:

‍• Diplomatic demands for appropriate redress

‍• Conduct high altitude/high speed reconnaissance operations over North Korea

‍• Conduct escorted reconnaissance flights in the same area with the same type of reconnaissance aircraft

‍• Request the Soviets to make representations to the North Koreans

‍• Destroy North Korean aircraft off the coast of North Korea

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‍The JCS said it would have to reposition forces to take these actions:

‍• Show of force

‍• Feints against North Korean air defenses

‍• Selective air strikes

‍• Blockade of North Korean ports.

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‍President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger talked by phone on April 15. Nixon had earlier asked whether there were any North Korean ships in the area. Kissinger said there was one Korean ship sailing with a Dutch registry, a Dutch crew, and flag. Kissinger opined it would be impossible to seize that ship. However, during this call, Nixon said he thought the US should “pick up the ship.” Kissinger was not excited about seizing this ship, but Nixon was. It apparently was one of North Korea's largest fishing ships. Nixon said, “We should just pick the darn thing up.” North Koreans once manned the ship, but following the USS Pueblo capture of 1968, she switched to Dutch crews.

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‍Nixon said the US had become a great nation by breaking international law and told Kissinger to find a way to do that. Nixon was adamant that the US could not just sit around and do nothing, that the price that was paid was too high to do nothing. Nixon had no problem dealing with the Dutch. Nixon complained that some were trying to cast the EC-121 as a regular reconnaissance plane that was fair game. Kissinger said it indeed was not a regular reconnaissance plane, but that it had been flying this kind of mission for 15 years with no protest. Kissinger opined that the North had made a deliberate decision to shoot it down. Nixon reiterated that the Dutch ship must not make it to North Korea. 

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‍It was at this point that the Department of State, lawyers, and the Justice Department entered the conversation. It so happened that Attorney General John Mitchell was with Kissinger and came on the line. The matter of contractual arrangements between the Dutch and Koreans was mentioned, and Kissinger said he did not have all the facts. However, Kissinger repeated that the US did not know where the ship was, other than it was on the high seas.

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‍Nixon told them he was resolved to take action, “even if I have to overrule everybody in the State Department.”

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‍Furthermore, Soviet Communist Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev despised North Korean leader Kim Il-sung. Kim had been a thorn in the Soviets’ side since at least 1956. Sergey Radcheko, published by Foreign Policy, wrote:

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‍“Kim … was one of Moscow’s most difficult allies, even though he owed his political fortune to Soviet patronage. Kim Il Sung was demanding, unreasonably militant, and prone to taking offense. When it suited his interests, he played on contradictions between Beijing and Moscow, keeping both at arm’s length. There were several moments in the Cold War when Kim Il Sung drove Moscow to utter exasperation.”

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‍As an example, Kim captured the USS Pueblo without consulting the Soviets. When Brezhnev summoned him to Moscow, he refused to go. The problem was that the Soviets had many international interests, and the North Koreans were making those exceedingly hard to attain. The Soviets especially did not want North Korea to go to war again on the peninsula.

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‍With that in mind, Kissinger discussed the EC-121 with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Dobrynin advised that he was concerned and thought the US ought to look dangerous.

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‍Nixon was not yet through with Kissinger, however. In a telephone call, Nixon asked about doing the “Lunch Plan.” As I understand it, the "Lunch Plan" was one option under a highly secretive overall plan named "Operation Menu" during the Indochina War. It described a series of bombing strikes planned against Cambodia in March 1969. It would start by executing the "Breakfast" Plan against one set of targets, the "Lunch" Plan against another, etc. I assume Nixon was referring to this approach as a good one for retaliation against North Korea.

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‍Nixon thought it would be fine if the US were caught bombing North Korea and told Kissinger he wanted every plane moved into South Korea. Kissinger said forces were getting ready to move, but urged caution, to which Nixon agreed. But Nixon would not give up on that Dutch ship. He told him to call Lloyds of London to find out where it was, or call the Hague to find out. 

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‍I should mention that Secretary Rogers was interested in a diplomatic protest, but Kissinger told him Nixon did not want to protest to anyone.

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‍April 15 was a long day for the White House. In an evening telephone call to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Kissinger posed eight questions addressing air strikes against North Korean targets. He followed that up with a written request and gave Laird until the afternoon of April 16 to have a response. The questions asked:

‍• Bombing the airfield from which the MiG-21 launched

‍• A plan for a naval blockade

‍• A plan for mining Wonson Harbor

‍• A plan for a submarine-launched torpedo attack against a North Korean military vessel inside or outside territorial waters

‍• The order of battle (OB) of US and North Korean forces.

‍• An assessment of US reinforcement requirements should the North Koreans attack the ROK after US retaliation with either air or with air and ground.

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‍It should also be noted that at about the same time, on the evening of April 15, Nixon authorized moving three aircraft carriers to waters off North Korea from Vietnam. They were to start sailing on April 15. Nixon was told they would be 72 hours away.

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‍USN Task Force 71 was assembled employing ships being used off the coast of Vietnam. Keep in mind that the war in Vietnam was full throttle at this time. TF-71 included aircraft carriers Enterprise, Ranger, and Ticonderoga, and the anti-submarine carrier Hornet, the battleship USS New Jersey, three cruisers, the Chicago, Oklahoma City, and Saint Paul, and 16 destroyers.

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‍On April 16, Admiral John McCain, USN, CINCPAC, urged the JCS to provide “immediate positive tasking” for TF-71. Commander Richard Mobley, USN, a defense intelligence specialist, said that Admiral McCain warned, “If we operate again in the Sea of Japan as a show of force and without positive action, I believe that we continue to provide justification to their judgment of us as ‘paper tigers.” McCain prepared several plans.

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On April 16, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird forwarded a first (rough) cut of the JCS concept of possible targets in North Korea that might be struck in retaliation. It suggested Wonson and Sondok airfields for attack, either from carrier-based aircraft or from USAF land-based fighter aircraft and carrier based aircraft. General Wheeler briefed the JCS views at a NSC meeting of April 16.

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‍USN aircraft would attack Wonson, and USAF and USN aircraft would attack Sondok. Options were provided if a single strike were preferred and if maximum destruction were preferred.

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‍A B-52 option was presented, employing from 24 to 48 aircraft out of Guam, recovering at Guam.

JCS recommended all US-ROK forces be placed on alert, covert attainment of DEFCON 3 at launch of the strike force, overt DEFCON 1 at Time over Target (TOT). Place the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) assets for nuclear war on alert throughout the Western Pacific (WestPac). Place USAF units in Japan and Okinawa on DEFCON 3 at TOT.

‍The JCS expected a range of North Korean reactions, including attacks against the ROK and intense action along the DMZ. Direct Chinese interference was not expected. Soviet reactions would probably be close surveillance. Both sides would engage in heavy propaganda.

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‍The mission would be to disrupt the military posture and impose a penalty. JCS warned that such an attack would be an act of war and that the North may retaliate against US-ROK forces. It recommended against attacking anything on the West Coast because of the high concentration of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and the fact that the operation would be so close to China. Flight operations from the Sea of Japan would also require an undesirable overflight of the ROK.

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‍Readiness Condition DEFON 3 requires an increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness. The USAF must be ready to mobilize in 15 minutes. DEFCON 1 means nuclear war is imminent. 

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‍SIOP was the United States' general plan for nuclear war from 1961 to 2003. The SIOP gave the president a range of targeting options and described launch procedures and target sets against which nuclear weapons would be launched. The plan integrated the capabilities of the nuclear triad of strategic bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and sea-based submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). 

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‍I need to inject some additional information about the employment of nuclear weapons.

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‍Bruce Charles, a former USAF F-4 fighter pilot, told National Public Radio (NPR) news that he was on temporary duty at Kunsan AB, ROK, on the day the EC-121 was shot down. NPR reported:

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‍"Early that afternoon (April 15, 1969), his commanding officer called him into his office, Charles says. 'When I got to see the colonel, it was very simple. He described the shooting down of the EC-121 about a hundred miles at sea. And that he had a message, which he showed me at that time, saying to prepare to strike my target,' Charles says. Charles then rechecked his F-4 fighter jet and the weapon it was carrying. He says it was a B61 nuclear bomb, with a yield of about 330 kilotons — not the biggest bomb in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, but more than 20 times the size of the bomb dropped over Hiroshima." Hours later, Charles said he was told to stand down. 

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‍NPR has said Charles' story could not be independently confirmed.

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‍Following the capture of the USS Pueblo on May 14, 1968, the JCS published a Top Secret (since declassified) memo to the CJCS addressing possible responses to a North Korean attack on the ROK. One item in the memo addresses a nuclear contingency plan against North Korea named "Freedom Drop." This plan would employ US tactical aircraft loaded with a nuclear weapon and/or Honest John and Sergeant missiles with nuclear warheads. The JCS staff approved the plan, which was drawn up by CINCPAC. The nuclear attacks could be limited or go to an all-out nuclear war.

That's as much as I have to say on the use of nuclear weapons. There have been allegations that Nixon was inebriated when thinking of using nuclear weapons. I'll not go into that. Apparently, he was a heavy drinker at night.

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‍On April 16, 1969, Mr. Richard Helms, the Director of the CIA, briefed the NSC on the situation in North Korea:

• The attack was deliberate. Purpose was to revive high level of tension with the US
• Kim Il Sung will act without regard to the Soviet Union and China. Shows himself to be strong and assertive
• Recall, however, North Korea has mutual defense treaties with both the USSR and China
• North Korea has again shown it can take on the mighty US
• No doubt Kim saw the EC-121 attack as low risk given the US reaction to the Pueblo (no reaction)
• Kim could focus public attention on challenging the US rather than on failing to attack the ROK
• The DPRK immediately asked for a meeting of the Military Armistice Commissions at Panmunjom for April 18
• The North Korean military has remained rather quiet since the shoot-down: no evidence of any change in military status
• The North Korean attack against the US was only one of many serious incidents. Aggressive actions toward the ROK have been much more frequent and increasingly severe.
• The Soviets had some ships in the area and helped with rescue operations. They also flew two Tu-16 bombers to reconnoiter the area
• North Korea can defend against an ROK attack, but would need help to attack the ROK

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‍Also on April 16, General Alexander Haig, the president’s military adviser, provided a memo to Dr. Kissinger. Haig seems to say a “do nothing” stance might stand up. He said retaliation is called for, but the US has to measure its ability to contain a worst-case scenario should it retaliate militarily. The US should demonstrate it has the capability and intent to use military force through reinforcement and increased readiness. The president can convey a message that he is ready to go to the mat without actually attacking. However, if the president wants to attack, hitting an airfield may not be the best option. A submarine ambush might be best. Future reconnaissance missions should be flown with an escort.

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‍Also on April 16, President Nixon chaired a National Security Council (NSC) session. Helms said North Korean military actions since the shoot-down have been limited, defensive if anything. There is no indication of survivors. (I cannot say for sure this is the first time the White House was told there were no survivors for sure, but I think it was.) Helms reviewed the mission track; Soviet tracking agrees with ours. 

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‍Nixon asked the CJCS, General Wheeler, to review the options. He did:

‍• Employ drones (I assume instead of manned reconnaissance aircraft)

‍• Escort future flights

‍• Show of air and naval force. Had no effect during Pueblo.

‍• An air strike against the North could cause the North to attack the ROK, and we could experience losses

‍• A blockade can be implemented within 48 hours, but it would have little effect as North Korea has very little shipping. The US could commandeer some North Korean ships; the Dutch ship is now at sea

‍• Sea-to-shore bombardment could be done within 48 hours. It would require air cover. The East Coast presents the best targets.

‍• Could attack areas adjacent to the DMZ using Honest John missiles, which are inaccurate at extreme range. That would violate the Armistice agreement and would trigger retaliation

‍• A ground raid across the DMZ would also be a violation and would cause the ROKs to do the same. Such raids would require heavy fire support for the ROKs.

‍• The US can conduct a wide variety of air attacks, using from 24 to 250 aircraft. Chances of success are excellent. Expect 2-8 percent losses.

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‍Secretary of State Rogers presented diplomatic options:

‍• Panmunjom talks are a forum; the North would probably talk and walk out. Recommend against this.

‍• The UN is a possibility, but we cannot expect much support. Members will wonder why we conduct such flights.

‍• No obvious need to move immediately. It might be best to watch for a change.

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‍President Nixon then started asking questions. I did not see the exchanges as very edifying. ROKs are concerned that we will do nothing. Diplomatic and military actions must be in synch. The Soviets and China are bound to the DPRK if we attack, though they do have an escape clause.

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‍On April 17, the JCS directed CINCPAC to prepare to bomb the airfields at Sondok and Wonsan. Once again, Cmdr. Mobely reported:

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‍“Launching from carriers, 12-24 A6s would fly ‘night full systems’ attacks against each airfield under CINCPAC Plan ‘Fracture Maple.’ The JCS also tasked the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to plan similar raids using as many as 24 B-52 bombers against each base.”

Mobely said the JCS asked the commander, US Forces Korea (USFK), to recommend actions on the peninsula that would demonstrate an increased readiness posture to the North. CINCPAC proposed other options, including using surface-to-air missile-equipped ships to sail within 50 nm of the DPRK, ready to shoot down any aircraft identified as North Korean. He also wanted to impound or harass North Korean coast craft and fishing boats going beyond the 12-mile limit, employ the battleship New Jersey (BB-62) to fire against selected targets in Wonson, and seize the ship built for the DPRK by the Netherlands.

‍On April 17, the CIA presented an intelligence memo.

• The North shot down the EC-121 without consulting China or the USSR. That could affect their decision-making if we retaliate.
• Any US military retaliation will be to underscore the right to use international airspace and deter against future hostilities. North Korea will not pay much attention to those.
• The North Koreans planned this event, betting the US would not retaliate based on the Pueblo experience.
• Kim Il sung may think the US is overextended in Vietnam, giving him latitude to act against the US with “relative impunity.”
• Kim Il sung likes to take risks, he likes to bluff and intimidate, especially a “mighty imperialist.”
• CIA believes Kim is trying to offset his failure to attack the ROK.
• He probably feels he must keep tensions high, among other things, hoping the American public will tire of the whole thing and cause American withdrawal or reduction in forces.
• A show of force will have little effect, and the DPRK is unlikely to challenge it.
• Intensification of non-combat actions will only help the DPRK convince the world that the US should withdraw.

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‍The CIA assessment on the expected impacts of retaliation was omitted from public view.

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‍During the evening of April 17, Dr Kissinger talked by phone with the president. The discussion centered on politics, especially as regards Secretary of Defense Laird vs. Secretary of State Rogers. It is clear Nixon favored Laird over Rogers. They also talked on an unsecured phone and discussed options in terms we cannot follow; e.g., option 1, option 2, etc. 

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‍There is a feeling in the discussion that there is no pressure to move quickly. President Nixon remained concerned that 31 souls were lost and the US was doing nothing. Kissinger affirmed that the EC-121 was where we had said it was. They kept talking in terms of the “Lunch” option, which refers to covert SAC bombing of targets in Cambodia, starting with “Breakfast” against a target,” Lunch” against another, etc. Kissinger felt “doing this” (whatever “this” was) would make or break Nixon’s presidency. Kissinger, I believe, was contemplating how to deal with Ambassador Dobrynin. I believe he would tell Dobrynin that the US will not tolerate another land war in Asia, even if the US had to go nuclear. Nixon opined that the press was urging action. The President felt a bold move was required to offset the erosion of public support for Vietnam. Kissinger agreed and said we would have to do it now or end up having to do it next year in a more bold way. I found this conversation hard to decipher since they were talking about numerical options and mixing the discussion with the “Lunch” options over Cambodia, mainly because they were on an unsecured phone.

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‍Richard L. Sneider of the NSC staff offered his thoughts on American public opinion. American support for a strong reaction will be there, and the people will be proud of a success, but all that will likely erode over a few weeks. Then questions will arise. There is Vietnam fatigue already. Overseas expect a dovish reaction. The North Vietnamese are likely to interpret intense action as meaning the Vietnam War will be extended. But if US public support erodes quickly, the North Vietnamese will renew pressures for the US to withdraw. Sneider concluded that his guess was that decisive action would not earn sustained support. The public will conclude that vital US interests were not at stake.

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‍Secretary of Defense Laird provided Nixon a memo on April 18 in which he provided his understanding of the alternative actions being considered. 

• Best option was a one-time air strike using carrier-based fighters.
• Did not favor using B-52s.
• Fighter aircraft will provide surprise and accuracy, and if an aircraft is lost, it will be more palatable than losing a B-52 and its larger air crew. Laird preferred employing the A-6.

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‍All that said, Laird recommended against any military option. He seemed unsure whether the US needed to fly so many reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan. He said escort flights are unsustainable. He felt more comfortable with explaining why the US conducts these flights, vowing to provide armed escort, challenge the North Koreans to try to stop us, instruct the military to destroy any North Korean aircraft or vessel approaching our aircraft outside their territorial airspace, and declare you retain the option to attack North Korea. 

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‍He concluded, saying the public and congressional members support the measured approach employed thus far. He also said he was unsure whether the US could handle two wars. He said the JCS could fight two wars for about a week. Diversions from Vietnam would have to be made. Logistics support would take 30 days after a Korean war started. Laird did not think the North Vietnamese would conclude that the action Laird is recommending was a sign of weakness. He believed that progress with Vietnamization, especially of the South Vietnamese Air Force, was proceeding well. Plans to attack Cambodia would meet strong public disapproval if we were at war in Korea.

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‍Laird said:

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‍“(An attack against North Korea would be an) episode that didn’t have to be, that carried far more risks than the potential pay-off would seem to dictate, and that led to general public disenchantment across a broad range of affairs. If, for example, we take losses during the strike, the question will be raised about losing more life to vindicate original losses.” 

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‍ROK President Park met with the US ambassador to the ROK, Mr. William Porter, on April 18, 1969 (Korean time) and said the American choice was between a counterblow that would impress the DPRK or the US could give up its right to operate over international waters. Park said he believed the North would repeat the EC-121 attack unless a strong US reply is made. He commented that the US refused to give the DPRK a strong warning after it captured the Pueblo and attacked the Blue House in Seoul. The result is the loss of the EC-121. Park acknowledged a strong American response would probably result in some action against the ROK. Apparently, Porter told Mr. Park that the US cannot engage in a strong military response.

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‍By the mid-evening of April 18, President Nixon, talking with Dr. Kissinger, seemed to believe he could run through the facts of the EC-121 flight, order continued flights of this kind, take whatever steps are necessary to protect them, and use whatever action is determined necessary. There would be no military retaliation.

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‍On April 20, 1969, the entire TF-71 gathered in the Sea of Japan. TF-71 remained until April 24. It never fired a shot.

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‍Recall that Nixon ordered the resumption of reconnaissance flights on April 18. However, between April 18 and 24, the Pentagon had authorized only one reconnaissance mission. On April 22, Laird told the president he had directed the JCS to request CINCPAC to prepare a plan to resume such flights. Kissinger pressed Laird hard to restart the flights and presented him with a formal memo telling him the president wanted these flights resumed along the Chinese coast from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Sea of Okhotsk. Laired decided to delay approving the JCS plan. He wanted to explore alternative methods of collection, reduction of flights against Korea and using unmanned or high fliers to do the job. Therefore, he delayed resuming reconnaissance flights. He thwarted Nixon’s order.

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‍On April 29, Kissinger told Laird by phone to resume China and Soviet flights, but hold off on flights to Korea involving fighter escorts.

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‍Kissinger went to the president. He urged him to call for a resumption personally. He feared the North Koreans would have attained their goal and that China and the Soviets might follow the North Korean model. He also objected to Laird defying the president three times. As a result, Nixon assigned the 303 Committee to take over the review of worldwide reconnaissance operations from the Department of Defense (DoD). The 303 had been formed to handle covert operations. The committee consisted of the Assistant to the National Security Affairs (Kissinger at present), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Undersecretary of State, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Secretary of Defense would not be a member.

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‍On April 24, Laird informed the president that General Wheeler had concluded that having four fighter-escorts accompany each reconnaissance mission “would be beyond the capability of currently assigned PACOM forces.”

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‍On April 29, Dr. Kissinger informed the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Director of the CIA that the president had directed the immediate resumption of regularly scheduled reconnaissance operations in the Pacific, including those targeted at North Korea. Combat Air Patrols (CAP) would be provided. The CAPs would be authorized to approach up to 50 nm of the North Korean, Soviet, or Chinese coasts.

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‍Many high-level and military command actions addressing North Korea ensued through May, including plans to attack North Korea in the event of a further provocation, assurances to President Park, and more in-depth studies regarding contingency planning.

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‍In looking at the reasons for doing nothing, the risk of igniting a wider war while the US was engulfed in the Indochina War was the one that prevented retaliation. There are some expert views on that below.

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‍Robert Wampler, a historian who works for the National Security Archive, a project of George Washington University, wrote:

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‍"The U.S. did not have a very good menu of options when this happened, which sort of constrained them in their ability to pick and choose amongst something that would work, and also contain the situation.” 

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‍“Contain the situation” seemed to be the watchword, despite an unprovoked attack that killed 31 American military people.

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‍Returning to Wampler:

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‍“The military produced the options, ratcheting up the level of military force all the way to all-out war and to using nuclear weapons. But constantly you find the military saying, 'But the risks probably still outweigh the potential gains,' " 

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‍Morton Halperin worked for the NSC at the time. He believed that Nixon did decide to retaliate:

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‍“Nixon had made a decision that we would retaliate by bombing the air base from which we believed the planes had come to shoot down the EC-121. And he had ordered an aircraft carrier to move close enough to be able to carry out the bombing.”

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‍But the reality was that both his Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State did not support such action, and there was also a fear of public sentiment.

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‍Dan Sneider of the Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University has said:

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‍“The danger of a wide war tends to trump whatever benefit you think might come from punishing your enemy here with a retaliatory strike.”

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‍Thomas Karamessines, the deputy director for plans at the CIA, was a member of the committee set up by Kissinger to deal with the EC-121. His comment here is revealing:

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‍“It is an eye-opener to some of us to learn that a retaliatory strike, if it had been ordered to take place within 24 hours of the shoot down of our plane, would have been practically impossible unless it were launched from South Korean land-based planes; and political as well as military considerations obviously made this inadvisable.”

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‍At the end of the day, President Nixon wanted to retaliate militarily, and so did Dr. Kissinger. But Nixon did not retaliate as he wanted to do.

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‍For his part, Kissinger was fed up with the entire executive branch process. He noted:

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‍"The fact of the matter was that toward the end the president really didn't use the NSC at all to speak of. I mean he hadn't used all of the staff of the NSC … Quite often … decisions were made by two or three or four people."

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‍He also wrote in his memoirs:

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‍"Our conduct in the EC-121 crisis was weak, indecisive and disorganized … I believe we paid in many intangible ways, in demoralized friends and emboldened enemies."

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‍Commenting in his book The White House Years, Kissinger wrote:

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‍"We made no strategic assessment; instead, we bandied technical expedients about. There was no strong White House leadership. We made no significant political move; our military deployments took place in a vacuum."

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‍Go to EC-121M, the mission and the shoot down

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