Talking Proud: Service & Sacrifice
Tien Sha: Covert Navy to North Vietnam
“Launch guerrilla operations into North Vietnam territory”
President John F. Kennedy
Introduction
This report addresses covert US naval operations from the Tien Sha Peninsula, near Da Nang Air Base (AB), Republic of Vietnam (RVN) before and during the US Indochina War. Starting in about 1964, Tien Sha served as a USN covert maritime operations base against North Vietnam (NVN).
There is quite a bit of absorbing history leading up to these activities from Tien Sha. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident of 1964 marked the official start of the US war in Indochina, but the US was planning and causing trouble in the area long before that. I recommend you remember the dates I mention: the US officially declared war in Vietnam in August 1964.
The Navy had, for many years, moved toward covert maritime operations. Since at least the 1920s, the Navy relied on ad-hoc spy networks and routine expeditions abroad to obtain information about other navies. Amphibious warfare during WWII became a new mission for the Navy and Marines. Planning for this kind of warfare demanded that the Navy commit to covert operations. I cover a good bit of this history in my report, “The “Rice Paddy Navy.”
Colonel Graves Erskine, USMC, began planning in 1942 for a unit of men specializing in reconnoitering enemy shores in preparation for invading Europe and North Africa, and ultimately the islands of the Pacific region.
The Army and Navy formed a joint unit called the Amphibious Scouts and Raiders (S&R) in 1942, understanding that amphibious landings would require reconnaissance of landing beaches, obstacles, and defenses, as well as to guide forces in.
In 1943, the US and Australia established the Special Services Unit One (SSU-1) to train in martial arts, hand-to-hand combat, map making, rubber craft operations, jungle survival, guerrilla tactics, and more. In short, they prepared to fight immediately upon landing and to fight their way inland.
The Navy began training the Chinese in guerrilla warfare to combat the Japanese. The Navy established Underwater Demolition Units (UDT) specifically for operations in the Pacific, where amphibious landings were crucial to the push toward Japan. Needs arose for hydrographic reconnaissance and underwater demolition to clear obstacles and better map coral rock formations.
Initially, much of their work involved conducting pre-assault beach reconnaissance up to the high tide line and performing combat demolition to support amphibious landing operations. Most of their reconnaissance was done by swimming.
The Navy SEAL Museum says this,
“The Korean War substantially changed UDT operational doctrine, giving the men vastly expanded mission capabilities. In addition to their traditional roles of amphibious reconnaissance and mine and obstacle clearance, the UDTs saw the scope of their mission expanded to include stealthy infiltration from the sea to conduct raids and attack enemy shipping, port, and harbor facilities; clearance of ordnance from the high seas; intelligence gathering; and the covering of the withdrawal of friendly forces.”
The Navy’s leadership realized that new units needed to be autonomous and more independent. While they might be administratively subordinate to amphibious commanders, they would also carry out special tasks assigned from outside, namely the CIA, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the President, and unified combatant commanders like the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, CINCPAC.
UDTs formed the foundation of the Navy SEALS, who became active in the US Indochina War.
The covert maritime activities from the Tien Sha Peninsula originated from this heritage. After WWII, American leaders formalized the approval processes for secret maritime operations, learning from past experiences and preparing for the future.
The path to “covertness”
In 1947, President Harry Truman signed the National Security Act, which established the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The US established the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG) in French Indochina in 1950. The MAAG’s main job was to provide military support to the French for their operations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
In August 1950, the Navy sent eight officers and men to Saigon to establish the Navy Section of the MAAG.
Secretary of State (SecState) John Foster Dulles sent Colonel Edward Lansdale, USAF, to Vietnam in 1954 to establish the CIA’s Saigon Military Mission (SMM). Its goal was to conduct psychological warfare against the NVN and carry out unconventional operations against the communist Viet Minh and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The SMM was in addition to the existing CIA station chief at the Saigon embassy.
During 1954 and 1955, the Navy formed Task Force 90 (TF 90) to carry out Operation Passage to Freedom, which evacuated Vietnamese people from NVN to RVN. The CIA’s airline, Civil Air Transport (CAT), also transported them out of NVN.
These naval and airborne evacuation efforts involved hundreds of thousands of refugees. They provided an ideal opportunity for the CIA’s covert activities throughout Vietnam, including undercover maritime operations. The CIA sent Vietnamese trainees to “secret training sites” in Okinawa and the Philippines.
In early 1956, RVN President Ngô Đình Diệm created the Presidential Liaison Office (PLO) with backing and advice from the CIA. Part of the PLO was tasked with conducting covert operations outside the RVN, including in NVN, Laos, and Cambodia. It started infiltrating NVN by sea in 1956, working in coordination with the CIA.
In December 1959, Admiral Harry D. Felt, USN, who was the commander of the Pacific Command (CINCPAC-PACOM), issued Operation Plan (OPLAN) 32-59, a series of U.S. military contingency plans to oppose communist aggression in Southeast Asia.
John F. Kennedy (JFK) became the President of the United States in 1961. He approved the general idea of Admiral Felt’s plan to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the RVN and Laos. JFK was an enthusiastic supporter of covert operations, land, sea and air.
On March 9, 1961, JFK signed National Security Action Memo 29 (NSAM-29), which directed the CIA to oversee covert operations in Laos. He quietly committed to taking action in the RVN as well. The CIA established Maritime Operations (MAROPS) for paramilitary officers to conduct activities in the maritime domain.
On May 11, 1961, President Kennedy approved National Security Action Memorandum 52 (NSAM 52) “to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam,” which, among other things, authorized a series of covert actions in the NVN and RVN. These included dispatching agents, conducting overflights of NVN for photo intelligence using American or Chinese Nationalist crews and equipment as needed, and expanding communications intelligence intercepts of Vietnamese communist communications in both the RVN and NVN. In short, the CIA was tasked with providing the manpower and resources for a covert war against the NVN.
Three more NSAMs were issued in June 1961: NSAMs 55, 56, and 57. NSAM 55 marked the start of shifting covert, secret operations in Vietnam from the CIA to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), meaning the military. JFK was smarting from the failure of the CIA-managed Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba.
President Kennedy pressed the CIA in 1960, soon after taking office, to carry out guerrilla operations in NVN. In 1961, the CIA Saigon station started infiltrating individual Vietnamese agents, known as “singletons,” into NVN, followed by dropping agents by air and sending teams by sea on junks, with supplies delivered by air. These missions proved unproductive and costly.
In December 1960, the CIA and PLO sent a single agent through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into the NVN. The agent made it to Hồ Xá, NVN, about 105 miles northwest of Da Nang, and returned safely.
In Spring 1961, the CIA and Vietnamese PLO prepared to send more “singletons.” In March 1961, an agent crossed by junk and landed at Dong Hoi, just above the DMZ. This agent stayed for four days and returned safely. The next went by motorized junk all the way to Ha Long Bay, about 350 miles north-northwest of Da Nang, as the crow flies. He joined up with his brother, and together they sent 23 messages by radio back to CIA/PLO officials. They were discovered and arrested. At least three more singletons were sent.
In April 1962, the CIA brought four Vietnamese trained in Taiwan to serve as commandos, codenamed “Team VULCAN,” and sent them to Da Nang to train in planting mines on enemy boat hulls. This marked the first operational effort of the Nautilus program. The missions were unsuccessful. Admiral Felt criticized the CIA for lacking an understanding of naval capabilities.
Navy SEALs to Indochina
The Navy officially created two SEAL teams in January 1962 after several decades of work to conduct naval guerrilla operations worldwide.
Seal Team-1 (ST-1) was located at the Naval Amphibious Base (NAB), Coronado, California, and co-located with UDTs 11 and 12.
SEAL Team Two (ST-2) was positioned at Naval Air Base, Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia, and co-located with UDT-21.
The existing UDTs supplied all the manpower to establish the new SEAL Teams.
In January 1962, ST-1 sent two men to the RVN, Chief Petty Officer (CPO) Robert Sullivan and CPO Charles Raymond, to conduct initial surveys. The SEALs trained South Vietnamese to be maritime commandos under a CIA program called “Nautilus,” where the commandos would sail to the NVN on junks. Nautilus I was captured, and Nautilus II returned to the RVN. They were unproductive.
Nautilus III involved the USS Catfish (SS-339) submarine in June 1972. Catfish conducted reconnaissance of NVN and confirmed three Swatow patrol boats on the Gianh River, about 165 miles northwest of Da Nang as the crow flies, in June 1962. The Swatow was the NVN’s Shantou-class gunboat.
Nautilus III sailed to the river's mouth, Vietnamese frogmen swam to the Swatows, attached limpet mines to their hulls, and returned to the junk. One mine detonated prematurely, killing the frogman and damaging the NVN boat.
A Swatow chased a frogman seen swimming, shot him dead, and wounded the captain of Nautilus III. The Swatow rammed the junk and captured the survivors. One survivor managed to escape, floated on the wreckage south of the DMZ, and was rescued by a Vietnamese Navy (VNN) patrol boat.
The CIA and PLO carried out numerous airborne drops into NVN during 1961 and 1962. In most cases, agents were captured and even used to send disinformation to the CIA and PLO. Airdrops of supplies and equipment to the agents often fell into NVN's hands. Little significant intelligence was obtained.
In July 1962, the CIA Saigon station planned to deploy 28 new teams on sabotage missions. The chief of External Operations stated, in a message to headquarters,
“The possibilities of any large diversion from the DRV (NVN) effort against South Vietnam are remote. Our operations are at too small a scale and initiated at too late a date [in the course of the Insurgency] to seriously affect DRV aggression against the South.”
In May 1962, SecDef McNamara and Admiral Felt visited Saigon and stressed that these small CIA operations were interesting, but they favored larger efforts led by the military.
In July 1962, SecDef McNamara convened a meeting with the State Department and CIA at which everyone agreed to transfer responsibility for commando attacks against the NVN from CIA to the Department of Defense (DoD) in a transfer that would be known as “Operation Switchback.”
The transfer would take some time, which explains why the CIA and the PLO were still conducting covert missions into 1963.
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Admiral Felt established the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), in February 1962. MACV was created to strengthen a more active US military effort against communist insurgents in South Vietnam. It became an official warfighting command when President Johnson responded to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in August 1964. It had prepared for such a development in advance, two years in advance.
I’ll highlight that in 1961, the CIA launched a covert program called the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) in Vietnam. It was a paramilitary effort designed for the US Army Special Forces to recruit, train, and arm ethnic minorities in Vietnam to fight against the Viet Cong and NVA. The CIDG fighters were arguably commanded by US Special Forces. Mobile strike forces were organized to attack the Viet Cong.
SecDef McNamara and SecState Dean Rusk urged the military and CIA to strengthen these CIDG forces to cause more harm to Hanoi. MACV viewed these CIDG forces as a valuable source of firepower. In short, MACV aimed to control them instead of the CIA.
DESOTO Missions
In April 1962, the Navy began deploying destroyers along the Chinese coast equipped with signals intelligence monitoring gear and operators. These missions were known as DESOTO patrols. The USS DeHaven (DD-469) conducted the first patrol offshore of Tsingtao, China. The Navy carried out eight of these patrols off the coast of China, North Korea, and parts of the USSR.
Following the patrols conducted against China, they shifted focus and carried them out against the NVN. The USS Maddox (DD-731) was involved in a DESOTO mission, and its encounter with the North Vietnamese patrol boats led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the United States going to war against North Vietnam. I will discuss these DESOTO missions later.
